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1
The Great Recession, Fallout,
and What We Learned
Eskander Alvi
Western Michigan University

The Great Recession (December 2007–June 2009) roiled financial
markets around the world and caused significant damage to the global
economy on a scale that is comparable only to the Great Depression.
Starting in the United States with the collapse of housing prices, its
reach expanded quickly to financial markets inside and outside the
country and soon swamped the international economy. The outsized
losses in the broader financial sector and the rapid deterioration of the
pace of aggregate economic activity posed extraordinary challenges on
many fronts. Not since the 1930s have policymakers been confronted
with such near-catastrophic events.
This volume presents five chapters on macro policy challenges in
the Great Recession from some of the country’s most distinguished
economists who came to Kalamazoo, Michigan, as part of the fiftyfirst Werner Sichel Lecture Series (2014–2015), which was sponsored
jointly by the Department of Economics at Western Michigan University
and the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. The chapters
included here follow from their presentations. The idea is that confronting the policy challenges will encourage more discussion and research
to better instruct future policy in dealing with comparable adversities.
It is now well understood that the Great Recession was caused
by a housing bubble that was enabled by easy access to credit and a
belief that housing prices would not fall. On the supply side, lenders
secured additional funds by selling their mortgages, which fed into
strong incentives to lend. Securitization of mortgages became common and created an aggressive lending cycle that started with lending
to home buyers, followed by selling the mortgages, which were then
securitized and sold to investors, leaving lenders with more funds to
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advance to other home buyers. Since the loan originators would pass on
the mortgages, they had little interest in making sure that the borrowers
were financially sound. Subprime mortgages that resulted were often
bundled with prime ones in complex ways, which made the risks less
transparent. Furthermore, the credit rating agencies deemed the securities worthy, giving them a seal of approval as a safe investment product. The near-collapse of the financial system wreaked havoc on itself
and the larger global economy. As Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) note in
their well-known research, output losses associated with financial crises can be dreadful and persistent. The 2008 recession lived up to that
description.
The authors in this book describe the unprecedented events and
the often-extraordinary policies put in place to limit the damage and
turn the economy around. Not surprisingly, some policies worked well
while others barely made a dent. An analysis of the many lessons and
encounters, successes and failures, will surely offer fresh perspectives
on how to manage the economy in a future crisis of comparable proportion. While some research has been conducted on the lessons of the
Great Recession, an appreciation of the accompanying challenges adds
value and enriches policy content. The hindsight afforded by the Great
Recession is invaluable, and in the following five chapters we hope to
underscore the main issues policymakers faced.
When beset by a crisis, we are prone to look for precedents in judging what kinds of policies are likely to be effective. Barry Eichengreen
offers that viewpoint by drawing analogies between the Great Depression and the Great Recession and the lessons learned. He also makes a
connection between politics and fiscal policies, drawing on historical
precedence. Even in the case of monetary policy, though the central
bank has much autonomy, the Federal Reserve worries about any potential compromise of independence if it is at odds with Congress or the
prevailing political sentiment. The challenges arising from the political
direction is a common theme in the book, a view that is well positioned
by Gary Burtless. No discussion of the Great Recession is complete
without the extraordinary policies taken by the Federal Reserve. Donald Kohn, who was the vice chair at the central bank from 2006 to 2010,
provides an explicit description of how the Federal Reserve dealt with
the crisis. Another common theme is the sluggish recovery. Laurence
Ball and his coauthors take on the lower trend path of potential GDP
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The Great Recession, Fallout, and What We Learned 3

following the 2008 recession and suggests fiscal stimulus to close that
gap, arguing that this could be achieved without increasing the public debt. The effects of the Great Recession quickly went international,
with financial crises outside the country often appearing to be worse
than in the United States. Kathryn Dominguez looks at the financial and
trade connections to ask if the foreign shocks were responsible for the
slow recovery in the United States.
In Chapter 2, Eichengreen presents a historical perspective on lessons learned from past crises and how they are applied—and often misapplied—in subsequent periods of turmoil. The major precedent—the
Great Depression of the 1930s—offered a variety of guidelines for policymakers, from preventing bank runs to providing emergency lending
and allowing stimulus on the fiscal side.
Policy did succeed in applying some lessons learned on many
fronts—on the financial side, it prevented a large-scale bank run,
aggressively lowering the federal funds rate and provisioning plenty
of liquidity through both quantitative easing when rates could not go
any lower and two fiscal stimulus packages to prop up spending. But
there was also failure in a few critical areas, the most notable being the
failure of Lehman Brothers. This seriously compromised the lender of
last resort obligation that the Fed normally maintains and in turn created an extraordinary degree of uncertainty regarding which financial
institution might fail next. Both Eichengreen and Burtless point to the
political climate of blame that may have been partly responsible—the
public perceived that the Federal Reserve was bailing out large banks
responsible for bringing about financial chaos, while homeowners with
bad mortgages and folks on Main Street were left in the lurch.
The central bank’s large-scale purchase of mortgage-backed securities was also viewed with apprehension in some quarters. There was
concern that it looked much like the elements leading up to the housing
bubble. To be sure, the housing market after the collapse did benefit
from the injection of direct liquidity, money that would normally not
flow in that direction because of extraordinary risks. Restoring supply
offered a much-needed lifeline to the mortgage and refinance market.
Political disenfranchisement aside, it is also hard to deny that a recognition of moral hazard was at play, that the Federal Reserve would not try
enough to corral a potential buyer for Lehman Brothers. Following the
purchase of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan Chase with a $30 billion loan
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from the Federal Reserve, one wonders how much more a prospective
buyer would require and whether that amount would be forthcoming.
The second shortcoming both Eichengreen and Burtless refer to is
that policymakers did not gauge the magnitude of the missteps. Once
Lehman Brothers failed, the financial sector entered a renewed vicious
phase of panic and uncertainty, the extent of which policy formulators had not anticipated. After the fact, though, central banks in the
United States and Europe worked hard to restore confidence, sparing
no resource to shore up the ailing institutions, which suggests they may
have miscalculated the fallout from Lehman’s demise. Perhaps because
Lehman was not a depository bank, the lessons from the Great Depression did not quite instruct policy in the Great Recession. A related deficiency, though on a different scale, was that while a housing bubble
was recognized early on, the scope and magnitude of the damage it
would bring to the real economy was not. The common policy view was
that any macro damage from the housing debacle would be limited. It
was not fully appreciated that extensive securitization of mortgages had
spread the risks well beyond the housing market. Because of the ease
of securitizing, lenders had an incentive to lend aggressively and pass
on the risks to buyers and holders of mortgage-backed securities. Such
risks were not properly priced, which became apparent only after the
collapse of house prices. In sum, policymakers had underestimated the
risks of their own missteps, as with the failure of Lehman, and did not
properly identify the broadening macro risks arising from the housing
market.
The third shortcoming was that although averting a disaster on the
scale and enormity of the Great Depression was reason for gratification,
that success planted the seeds for policy reversion. Once the economy
had stabilized with 10 percent unemployment and growth resumed,
although tepid, policymakers breathed a sigh of relief and eased their
policy efforts too soon. Eichengreen and Burtless argue that at this juncture the urgency for a continuation of policy receded and deficit and
debt worries surfaced. In the United States, a $1.2 trillion spending cut
over 10 years was approved in 2011, the Bush tax cuts elapsed, and
the sequester—8.5 percent cut in federal spending across the board—
was put in place in 2013. Eichengreen argues that the turn to austerity
was even more pronounced in Europe, with euro area deficits falling
sharply in 2012, despite the return to a recession, while in the U.K. its
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government turned to fiscal consolidation. Central banks also became
reticent after the first stint of victory. The Federal Reserve was cautious
in expanding its unconventional measures, waiting until its third round
of quantitative easing to make open-ended asset purchases. In 2010 the
European Central Bank began to phase out unconventional measures,
followed by two premature interest rate increases in 2011.
In Chapter 3, Burtless considers the political fallout from the recession and the subsequent challenges for policy in generating an appropriate pace of recovery. He argues that while monetary policy was active,
the fiscal side was rather restrained. Following two fiscal stimulus packages, one in late 2008 and the other in early 2009, there were heightened
concerns of unsustainable government debt and a severe public backlash. The perception was that the dollars were being misused to bail out
large banks and that the large deficits would be ruinous to the economy.
To be sure, the Troubled Asset Relief Program did involve the Treasury
buying stocks of distressed financial corporations, but the amount was
a fairly small percentage of the overall fiscal stimulus, and in fact, the
Treasury did not lose money on this particular undertaking. Nonetheless, political sentiment did not support any additional stimulus even
though it gradually became clear that the recession was more severe
than originally thought. Burtless also observes that once the financial
sector stabilized, with the panic there retreating, the willingness to pass
any additional stimulus to reduce unemployment simply dissipated.
This reaction is not unusual, Burtless notes in comparing with events in
some Western European countries that had high but stable unemployment rates in the 1980s. Once the threat of layoffs ebbs, the motivation
to pass new measures to prop up employment also withers.
The institutional setup of fiscal and monetary policies is different. With monetary decision-making delegated to mostly seven voting members of the Federal Reserve Board, policy actions are usually
swift. Fiscal policy, in contrast, is determined in the political arena with
wider debate and requires approval of both houses of Congress. This
often leads to delays and lags. The mix of fast-acting monetary policy
with unhurried fiscal policy is generally a good balance. When a major
shock like the Great Depression or the Great Recession strikes, however, monetary policy alone may not suffice, and promptness on the
fiscal side may be warranted. With interest rates at zero, this was clearly
such a scenario. Burtless argues that, with fiscal policy passage subject
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to political jostling, even in times of great need, as in the Great Recession, the prospect of stimulus can be tardy and unreliable. Additionally,
the window of action is often short and closes once the peril of rising layoffs has passed, even though the unemployment rate can remain
high. This challenge that Burtless identifies clearly bears recognizing
as a constraint on policy timing and possible options for fiscal action.
Monetary policy played a key role in stabilizing the economy. In
Chapter 4, Donald Kohn describes the new and not-so-new policies that
were put in place. One of the challenges he describes was that institutions in the financial maelstrom were not banks. Securitization, often
involving subprime mortgages, had drawn in a variety of financial institutions that did not take deposits and therefore were not subject to close
supervision. With subprime mortgages packaged in obscure ways, it
was difficult to know where the losses would ultimately accrue following the collapse of the housing market. The feedback between the financial and the real sectors meant financial institutions under stress needed
to sell assets, often at fire-sale prices, which would drive down asset
prices, including house prices, and increase foreclosures, which would
further adversely impact the financial sector. Kohn notes that the central
bank was not particularly equipped to deal with such a crisis. Under
the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, the Fed is not able to directly lend to
households and businesses, but it could act in the financial market to
reduce the stress and end the fire sale of assets, which would be a relief
to both Wall Street and Main Street. To stop the financial implosion,
in 2008 the Fed started to lend to nonbank institutions, something it
had not done since the 1930s. This broad provisioning included brokerdealers, money market funds, issuers of commercial paper, and buyers
of securitized debt.
Securitization also spread the risks to foreign banks through their
purchase of securitized debts that were funded by short-term deposits
and borrowings in foreign currencies that were later converted to dollars in swap markets. With the crisis deepening, access to swaps became
difficult so they had to bid directly for dollars, which put upward pressure on interest rates. To ease the situation the Fed created central bank
foreign currency liquidity swaps—it directly lent dollars to foreign central banks so that they could lend where appropriate to their banks. The
extension of risks to nonbanks and foreign financial institutions posed
particularly acute challenges for policymakers.
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A well-known special challenge facing the central bank was posed
by having reached the zero lower bound—the federal funds rate could
not be lowered. This was possibly the biggest hurdle for monetary policy. In late 2008 and early 2009, the Fed purchased long-term assets
composed of government bonds and mortgage-backed securities. This
came to be known as quantitative easing. The Fed first bought mortgage
securities in 1971, following legislation that amended section 14(b) of
the Federal Reserve Act, which allowed the central bank to buy and sell
in the open market mortgage securities that were fully guaranteed by
an agency of the U.S. government. When Congress passed that legislation, essentially to ease funding in the housing market, the central bank
was uncomfortable in that role, and in 1981 made the last purchase of
agency debt before the Great Recession (Haltom and Sharp 2014). The
size of asset purchases in the Great Recession, including that of mortgage securities, is unprecedented. However, as Kohn points out, this
was an example of a policy that was in the books but long remained dormant, and was put to vigorous use in this recession. It could be argued,
by comparison with the 1970s, that the central bank was easing from a
situation of exigency rather than normalcy and was evidently less reluctant in exercising that option.
The Federal Reserve also introduced forward guidance—promising
to keep the Fed funds rate near the floor for prolonged periods, or until
certain inflation and unemployment targets were met. This effectively
tethered the future Fed funds rate and removed any perceived upward
bias from the central bank’s actions going forward. The combination
of asset purchase and forward guidance kept longer-term interest rates
low and favorably impacted asset prices, including house prices, and
encouraged consumer and business spending. Some of the monetary
policy measures discussed here started under Fed Chair Ben Benanke
and continued under the stewardship of Chair Janet Yellen.
It is useful to note that in the variety of efforts to stabilize the economy, the Fed did not deviate from its usual inflation and unemployment
targets—2 percent and full-employment, though it has been argued by
some economists that a higher inflation target would provide a stronger
boost to aggregate demand. Perhaps the Fed was not comfortable altering the key anchor of monetary policy, an action that would signal a
different policy regime and risk confusion about its commitment to low
inflation. On the unemployment side, with the natural rate being strictly
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unknown, the Fed showed a willingness to continue with low interest
rates until inflation reached its threshold, rather than raise rates once the
unemployment rate reached a predetermined level. This approach let
the actual unemployment rate reach 4.3 percent in May 2017.
Kohn argues that communicating the purpose and scope of the policies turned out to be a serious challenge—it was difficult to explain that
the Federal Reserve was not bailing out failing institutions but rather
providing liquidity to keep the banking and the larger financial system
functional. Confusion among the public and in Congress created suspicion and made it difficult to execute policy as needed. It would have
been helpful to have had a process to explain the scope of the problem
and what has to be done and why, possibly along the lines of the Fed
chair directly communicating to the public via the media, something
Bernanke had done on a couple of occasions.
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, GDP growth remained sluggish. The disappointing recovery is central to Chapter 5, by Laurence
Ball, J. Bradford DeLong, and Lawrence H. Summers. The authors
focus on potential GDP and note that its revision was noticeably below
the counterpart based on pre-2008 trends, about 7 percent lower, and
that estimates by Reifschneider, Wascher, and Wilcox (2013) and the
Congressional Budget Office (2014) suggest that about two-thirds of
the loss was permanent in nature. In the face of high unemployment and
the economy’s infrastructure in need of upgrade and repair, the authors
propose closing this potential GDP gap by use of fiscal measures. Their
choice of fiscal makes good sense given that monetary policy had
reached the zero lower bound. In that liquidity trap scenario, an argument is made that a properly designed stimulus would likely reduce
rather than increase the debt burden, the logic being that a stimulus
would directly raise revenue and in turn lower the debt/GDP ratio, create positive supply effects of public investment, and possibly lead to
reductions in real interest costs arising from an increase in expected
inflation. Additionally, the debt problem that is normally associated
with tax cuts would be mitigated by the hysteresis effects of rising output and employment. Thus, Ball and his coauthors make the forceful
argument that with interest rates so low, crowding out would not dilute
the expansionary effort and a tax cut would pay for itself.
Referring to some simple calculations by DeLong and Summers
(2012), Ball et al. reason that a hysteresis parameter of 0.05 (a $1.00
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increase in current output having a positive effect of $0.05 on potential output) via investment, employment, and other favorable effects
would suffice in leaving the national debt unchanged in the face of a
tax break. The policy challenge here is that with interest rates at their
historic lows, this would be a great opportunity for the government to
cut taxes and borrow to fund infrastructure. But the political process
that is essential to the tax and spend changes may not cooperate, leaving
the central bank to continue to assume almost singlehandedly the task
of lifting the economy.
The Great Recession started in the United States but spread to other
countries through financial and trade linkages. A high degree of financial integration between developed countries meant a synchronous
effect of the U.S. financial fallout on other countries. Trade was a second channel that transmitted the adverse consequence across nations. In
Chapter 6, Kathryn M.E. Dominguez also notes that the recession was
especially severe because of its financial origins, pointing to research
by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), who document the vicious effects on
the economy compared to other kinds of recessions. In an integrated
system, this can be disastrous both in the size of the downturn and
its duration, as exemplified by the Great Depression. Fortunately, in
the Great Recession both fiscal and monetary policy were aggressive,
which limited the downside. However, on the issue of recovery, she
notes, the Great Recession seriously lagged compared to its predecessors (recoveries across the past 11 recessions).
Dominguez maintains that one reason for the weak revival was
unfavorable transnational effects. Whereas the United States was weak,
the rest of the world was weaker. What appeared to be the beginning
of a healthy rebound near the end of 2009 proved to be too optimistic.
Europe’s financial and fiscal difficulties were becoming full blown, and
by 2011 the tsunami and earthquake in Japan and the fiscal impasse
in the United States led to considerable revisions of growth forecasts.
Japan’s return to recession in 2013 and again in 2014, combined with
the Russian ruble crisis, created enough downside momentum to limit
growth in the United States. To examine the reasons for the slow recovery, Dominguez and Shapiro (2013) use forecast revisions and narrative information from contemporaneous news reports. They find that
shocks originating from Europe were the cause between 2010 and
2012. Updating the narrative evidence through 2014 and including a
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broader group of countries, Dominguez finds that the focus shifts from
the United States in 2008–2009 to the Eurozone in 2010, Asia in 2011,
and Russia in 2014.
Transmission of shocks across borders creates a special kind of vulnerability and poses a challenge for policy. During the recession, there
was some cooperation between the Federal Reserve and major central
banks. An example, as mentioned earlier, was the establishment of
swap lines, which several foreign banks used. But more general coordination is tricky, since shocks have diverse origins and require different
policy responses that are not easy to complement. The tsunami in Japan
in 2011 required a very geographically targeted fiscal response by the
Japanese government, while bank bailouts in Southern Europe involved
the European Union, the European Central Bank, and the International
Monetary Fund. The low interest rate policy in the United States clearly
helped, but it would be difficult to argue that Federal Reserve should
lower rates because of the negative external events, though perhaps the
timing of any change in interest policy can be amenable.
The chapters presented here offer an account of the lessons and concurrent challenges faced by policymakers in the 2008 recession. While
the lessons discussed are mostly economic, they are almost always seen
by both policymakers and the public through the lens of history, politics, and institutions. This often made navigating the course difficult in
the recession and presented additional hurdles. One of the contributions
of this book is not only a better understanding of the lessons but also
of their nuances, limitations, and boundaries. This balance, it is hoped,
will better guide future policy in situations of similar distress.
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2
The Great Depression
and the Great Recession
in a Historical Mirror
Barry Eichengreen
University of California, Berkeley

History is a lens through which we—the public and elected and
appointed officials—view current problems. The logic of historical
analogy is never more compelling than during crises, as there is no time
for careful analytical reasoning and no time for building formal models
or testing them for fitness to data. In such circumstances, the influence
of reasoning by analogy, particularly historical analogy, is considerable.
For example, foreign policy specialists point to the powerful influence
of the Munich analogy in President Truman’s decision to intervene in
Korea.1 Or, think of the power of the analogy between 9/11 and Pearl
Harbor, for which a Google search produces nearly 100,000 hits.
So it was with the Great Recession of 2008–2009 and the Great
Depression of 1929–1933, the two great macroeconomic crises of the
past century. There is no doubt that conventional wisdom about the
earlier episode, which is referred to colloquially as “the lessons of the
Great Depression,” powerfully shaped and informed the response to the
crisis of 2008–2009.2
The decisions of policymakers were powerfully shaped and
informed by received wisdom about the mistakes of their predecessors.
In the 1930s when the crisis hit, those predecessors had succumbed to
the protectionist temptation. They had cut public spending at the worst
possible time and failed to stabilize the money supply. Neglecting their
responsibility for financial stability, they had failed to provide emergency liquidity to the banking system. The result was collapsing banks,
collapsing prices, collapsing trade, and collapsing activity—in a phrase,
the great macroeconomic catastrophe of modern times.

13
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That this economic crisis reflected disastrous but avoidable policy
failures became conventional wisdom, courtesy of influential analyses
from economists such as Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, whose
book Monetary History of the United States devoted a 110-page chapter to the episode they dubbed “The Great Contraction” (Friedman and
Schwartz 1963). In 2008, heeding the lessons of this earlier episode,
policymakers vowed to do better. If their predecessors’ failure to provide emergency liquidity had produced a cataclysmic banking and
financial crisis, then this time they would flood the markets with liquidity and otherwise provide emergency assistance to the banks. If the failure of those predecessors to stabilize the money supply had resulted
in a destructive deflation, then this time they would cut interest rates
and expand central bank balance sheets. If efforts to balance budgets
had worsened the earlier slump, then this time they would apply fiscal
stimulus instead.
As a result of this very different response, unemployment in the
United States peaked in 2010 at just 10 percent. This was still painfully high, to be sure, but it was far below the catastrophic 24 percent
scaled in the Great Depression. This time failed banks numbered in the
hundreds, not thousands. While dislocations were widespread, the utter
collapse of financial markets, as in the 1930s, was successfully averted.
And what was true of the United States was true also of other countries. Every unhappy country is unhappy in its own way, and there were
varying degrees of economic unhappiness starting in 2008. But, a few
ill-starred European countries notwithstanding, that unhappiness did
not rise to 1930s levels. Because policy was better, the decline in output
and employment was less steep, the social dislocations were fewer, and
the pain and suffering were less.
Unfortunately, this happy narrative of sage policy informed by
“the lessons of history” is a bit too positive. For one thing, it is hard
to square with the failure to anticipate the risks. As Queen Elizabeth II
famously asked on a visit to the London School of Economics in 2008:
“Why did no one see it coming?” (Pierce 2008). Some economists later
claimed that they had seen “it” coming (Telegraph 2009), but they actually warned of crises that did not occur, like a collapse of the dollar, or
issued only vague warnings and without pointing to specific risks.
That even specialists on financial crises did not sound louder warnings—there’s my mea culpa—suggests adopting a somewhat less criti-
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cal posture toward officials in the 1920s for failing to anticipate and
head off the risks that resulted in their crisis. Our failure reflects what
psychologists refer to as “continuity bias,” the subconscious tendency
to believe that the future will resemble the relatively recent past (Omer
and Alon 1994).3 It reflects peer pressure to conform and the costs of
being ostracized if, for example, you criticized Alan Greenspan’s financial stewardship at Jackson Hole in 2005, as one academic was reckless
enough to do (Rajan 2005). It reflects the power of a dominant ideology,
in this case the ideology of market efficiency and financial liberalization (Patomaki 2009; Suarez and Kolodny 2011). And it reflects the
influence of money politics—the influence of big financial institutions,
through their political contributions and the revolving door between
Wall Street and Washington—in shaping the policy debate (Igan and
Mishra 2011; Igan, Mishra, and Tressel 2011; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi
2010).
Ultimately, however, I would argue that the roots of this failure to
see the recent crisis coming lay in the same progressive narrative of the
Great Depression. Entirely correctible flaws of collective decision making, that narrative explained, had been responsible for the inability of
contemporaries to appreciate the risks to stability in the 1920s and then
for their failure to deal effectively with the consequences in the 1930s.
Modern-day policymakers had learned from the mistakes of their predecessors. Scientific central banking informed by a rigorous framework
of inflation targeting now reduced economic and financial volatility and
prevented serious imbalances. Advances in supervision and regulation
limited financial excesses. Deposit insurance, put in place in response
to the experience of the 1930s, had eliminated the danger of bank runs
and financial panics. Conventional wisdom about the Great Depression,
that it was caused by avoidable policy failures, was itself conducive to
the belief that those failures could be and, indeed, had been corrected. It
followed that no comparable crisis was possible now. All of which we
now know was dreadfully wrong.
Part of the problem is that we—in this case I mean we economic
historians—had always done a better job of explaining the course of the
Great Depression than we had in explaining its onset.4 We had failed to
highlight how rapid financial innovation had combined with inadequate
regulation and lax monetary policy to create dangerous financial fragilities.5 We had failed to explain how capital flows to one half of Europe
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from the other half of Europe and the rest of the world had set up that
continent for a fall.6 We had failed to explain how the naïve belief that
advances in scientific central banking had rendered crises a thing of
the past, which led contemporaries to discount the risks to financial
stability (however, see Barber [1985]). We had failed to explain how
a long period of stability—in the 1920s they called it “the New Era”
rather than, as recently, the Great Moderation, although the underlying
phenomenon was fundamentally the same—encouraged excessive risk
taking and empowered those who argued against stricter regulation.7
Recent experience suggests the need to write this history more carefully. Had we done so earlier, we might have seen more clearly how the
same factors were at work in the early twenty-first century.
The fateful decision to let Lehman Brothers fail—the single event
that most threatened the stability of global financial markets—also suggests looking at the 1920s differently. Lehman failed because it was
insolvent—because its managers had made bad bets. It failed because
there were doubts about whether the Fed and Treasury had the legal
authority to rescue it.8 But it also failed because policymakers wanted
to make a statement. Having bailed out Bear Stearns six months earlier,
they were eager to signal that not everyone would be rescued. And they
wanted to shield themselves from criticism from politicians that they
were too quick to bail out troubled banks.9
Because they lived through this experience, future historians are
likely to write the history of the Great Depression differently. They will
be reminded that the banking crises of the 1930s reflected not only the
fact that central banks and governments failed to appreciate the need to
act as lenders of last resort, but, as with Lehman Brothers, their concern
with moral hazard and wish to push back against political criticism.
The great banking crisis of early 1933 resulted from the failure of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation to rescue Henry Ford’s Guardian
Group of banks, unleashing a panic that engulfed first the state of Michigan and then the rest of the country.10 In fact, that decision reflected the
criticism to which U.S. politicians, from President Herbert Hoover on
down, had been subjected for rescuing Central Republic Trust, the bank
of former Vice President (and former Reconstruction Finance Corporation head) Charles Dawes, six months earlier (Vickers 2011). We are
reminded that this instinctual desire to “teach them a lesson,” to play
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financial hardball, especially when doing so is a way for officials to
rescue their reputations, is deeply ingrained.
There was also the failure to anticipate how disruptive the failure
of Lehman Brothers would be. Here too I would blame the “lessons of
the Great Depression.” The conventional narrative about the Depression focused on the disruptive impact of bank failures and runs by
retail depositors.11 Lehman was not a deposit-taking bank; it did not
have retail depositors.12 Therefore, the conclusion followed, its failure
couldn’t pose such serious problems.
This view, informed by the lessons of the Great Depression, was
why the Basel Accord setting capital standards for internationally active
financial institutions focused on commercial banks. Deposit insurance, which was supposed to prevent bank runs, focused on commercial banks. Regulation generally focused on commercial banks. This
focus neglected the shadow banking system of investment banks, hedge
funds, money market funds, commercial paper issuers, and securitizers. It ignored Lehman’s derivatives positions. It ignored the fact that
wholesale creditors could effectively run on the bank. The result was the
decision to allow the uncontrolled failure of Lehman Brothers, which
in my view was the single most serious mistake of the financial crisis.
At this point policymakers realized that they had a situation on their
hands—that the U.S. and world economies were on the verge of another
Great Depression. The leaders of the advanced industrial countries
quickly issued a joint statement that no systematically significant financial institution would be allowed to fail. American International Group
(AIG) was bailed out, albeit not on terms that satisfied everyone concerned.13 A reluctant U.S. Congress passed the Troubled Asset Relief
Program on the second try, to aid the banking and financial system.
Gordon Brown assembled the Group of Twenty countries in London in
February 2009 to produce their so-called “Trillion Dollar Package” of
coordinated fiscal-stimulus measures.14 One after another, governments
took steps to provide capital and liquidity to distressed financial institutions. Central banks flooded financial markets with liquidity. Policymakers congratulated themselves that they had avoided another Great
Depression.15
Yet the results of these policy initiatives were decidedly less than
triumphal. Postcrisis recovery in the United States was lethargic. It pro-
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ceeded at less than half the pace of a normal recovery, a couple of quarters of exceptionally rapid growth in the middle of 2014 notwithstanding to the contrary. Europe did even worse, experiencing a double-dip
recession and renewed crisis starting in 2010.
This was not the successful stabilization and vigorous recovery
promised by those who had learned the lessons of history.16 The reasons
why are no mystery. Starting in 2010 the United States and Europe took
a hard right turn toward austerity. Spending under the American Recovery and Investment Act, President Obama’s stimulus program, peaked
in fiscal year 2010 and then headed steadily downward. In the summer
of 2011, the Obama Administration and the Congress then agreed to
$1.2 trillion of spending cuts to be implemented over 10 years. In 2013
came expiry of the Bush tax cuts; the end of the temporary reduction
in employee contributions to the Social Security Trust Fund; and the
sequester (the across-the-board 8.5 percent cut in federal government
spending). All this took a big bite out of spending, aggregate demand,
and economic growth.17
In Europe the turn was even more dramatic. In Greece, where spending was out of control, a dose of austerity was clearly required. But the
adjustment program on which the country embarked starting in 2010
under the watchful eyes of the European Commission, the European
Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund was unprecedented. It required the Greek government to reduce spending and raise
taxes by an extraordinary 16 percent of GDP over four years—in effect,
to eliminate more than one-seventh of all spending in the Greek economy. The governments of the euro area as a whole cut budget deficits
modestly in 2011 and then sharply in 2012, despite the fact that the
currency area was back in recession and other forms of spending were
stagnant. Even the United Kingdom, which had the flexibility afforded
by a national currency and a national central bank, embarked on an
ambitious program of fiscal consolidation, cutting government spending and raising taxes by a cumulative 5 percent of GDP.18
Central banks, having taken a variety of exceptional steps in the
crisis, were similarly anxious to return to business as usual. The Fed
undertook three rounds of quantitative easing (QE)—multimonth purchases of Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities—but hesitated to ramp up those purchases even further despite an inflation rate
that undershot its 2 percent target and growth that continued to disap-
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point for three additional years. Not until QE3 did it finally make the
kind of open-ended commitment sufficient to vanquish the threat of
deflation once and for all.19
And if the Fed was reluctant to do more, the ECB was eager to do
less. In 2010 it prematurely concluded that recovery was at hand and
started phasing out its nonstandard measures. In 2011 it raised interest
rates twice. Anyone seeking to understand why the European economy
failed to recover and instead dipped a second time need look no further.
What lessons, historical or otherwise, informed this extraordinary
turn of events? For central banks there was, as always, deeply ingrained
fear of inflation. That fear was nowhere deeper than in Germany, given
memories of hyperinflation in 1923. German fear now translated into
European policy, given the Bundesbank-like structure of the ECB and
the desire of its French president, Jean-Claude Trichet, to demonstrate
that he was as Teutonic an inflation fighter as any German.20
The United States had not experienced hyperinflation in the 1920s,
nor at any other time for that matter, but this did not prevent overwrought commentators from warning that Weimar was right around
the corner.21 The lesson from the 1930s—that when the economy is in
near-depression conditions with interest rates at zero and ample excess
capacity, the central bank can expand its balance sheet without igniting
inflation—was lost from view. Sophisticated central bankers such as
Chairman Bernanke clearly knew better, but there is no doubt that they
were influenced by the criticism. The more hysterical the commentary,
the more loudly the Congress accused the Fed of debasing the currency.
The more Fed governors then feared for their independence. This rendered them anxious to start shrinking the Fed’s balance sheet toward
normal levels before there was anything resembling a normal economy.
This criticism was more intense to the extent that unconventional
policies had gotten central bankers into places they didn’t belong, like
the market for mortgage-backed securities (Cecchetti 2009). The longer the Fed continued purchasing mortgage-backed securities—and it
continued into 2014—the more the institution’s critics complained that
policy was setting the stage for another housing bubble and another
crash. This, of course, was the same preoccupation with moral hazard
that had contributed to the disastrous decision not to rescue Lehman
Brothers. In the case of the ECB, of course, the moral-hazard worry
centered not on the markets but on the politicians. For the central bank
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to do more to support growth would just relieve the pressure on governments, allowing reforms to lag and risks to accumulate. The ECB
allowed itself to be backed into a corner where it was the enforcer of
fiscal consolidation and structural reform. And in its role as enforcer,
economic growth became the enemy.
In the case of fiscal policy, the argument for continued stimulus
was weakened by its failure to deliver everything promised, whether
because politicians were prone to overpromising or because the shock
to the economy was even worse than understood at the time.22 There
was the failure to distinguish how bad conditions were from how much
worse they would have been without the policy. There was the failure
to distinguish the need for medium-term consolidation from the need
for public support for spending in the short term. There was the failure
to distinguish the need for fiscal consolidation in countries with gaping
deficits and debts, like Greece, from the situation of countries with the
space to do more, like Germany. Thus, a range of factors came together.
The one thing they had in common was failure.
Inevitably, failures like these have multiple causes. There was the
dominance of ideology and politics over economics analysis. There was
the failure of economists to effectively make the case for better policies. There was the tendency of economists to forget as many lessons
of the 1930s as they remembered. But the most powerful factor in this
premature decision to abandon policies that would have done more to
support the economy when the economy still needed support was surely
that policymakers had prevented the worst. They had avoided another
Great Depression. They could declare the emergency over. They could
therefore heed the call for an early return to normal policies. The irony
is that their very success in preventing a 1930s-like economic collapse
led to their failure to support a more vigorous recovery.
And what was true of macroeconomic policy was also true of financial reform. In the United States, the Great Depression led to the GlassSteagall Act separating commercial from investment banking. It led to
the adoption of federal deposit insurance. It led to the creation of the
Securities and Exchange Commission to oversee the operation of securities markets, putting paid to the myth of market self-regulation. There
were calls now for a new Glass-Steagall, the earlier act having been
laid to rest in 1999, but there was nothing remotely resembling such
far-reaching regulatory reform.
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The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010 contained some modestly useful measures, from the Volcker
Rule limiting speculative trading by financial institutions to the creation
of a Consumer Financial Products Bureau. But the big banks were not
broken up. Rhetoric to the contrary, little was done about the problem of
too big to fail (Gormley, Johnson, and Rhee 2015). There was nothing
approaching the thorough-going redrawing of the financial landscape
that resulted from Glass-Steagall’s sharp separation of commercial
banking, securities underwriting, and insurance services.23
The fundamental explanation for the difference is again the success of policymakers in preventing the worst. In the 1930s, the depth of
the Depression and the collapse of banks and financial markets wholly
discredited the prevailing regime. This time depression and financial
collapse were avoided, if barely. This fostered the belief that the flaws
of the prevailing system were less. It weakened the argument for radical
action, took the wind out of the reformers’ sails, allowed the banks to
regroup, and allowed petty disagreements among politicians to slow the
reform effort. Success thus became the mother of failure.
To be clear, the argument is not that it would have been better to
allow the big banks to collapse in late 2008 and early 2009. The consequences for output and employment would have been devastating.
Avoiding those devastating consequences and limiting unemployment
to 10 percent was a considerable achievement, under the circumstances.
But it was an achievement with unintended consequences.
The same is true of Europe’s failure to embark on more far-reaching
financial reform. This reflected the difficulty of decision making in a
European Union of 27 countries. But it also reflected the fact that the
EU did just enough to hold its monetary union together. Through emergency loans and the creation of an ECB facility to buy the bonds of
troubled governments, it did just enough to prevent the euro system
from falling apart. This success in turn limited the urgency of proceeding with more far-reaching reform, from across-the-board debt writedowns to creation of a banking union with a single supervisor for all
of Europe’s banks and a mechanism for directly recapitalizing troubled
financial institutions.
Thus, the very success with which policymakers limited the damage from the worst financial crisis in 80 years means that we are likely
to see another such crisis in considerably less than 80 years.
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This chapter would be incomplete if it didn’t address more about
Europe and the euro, given how the euro crisis became the second leg
of the global financial crisis. The decision to create the euro in 1999 was
one of the greatest economic policy blunders of the twentieth century.
(A fitting way, some would say, to bring a century of great economic
policy blunders to a close.) In this case, unlike the 2008 crisis, some of
us like to think—to echo Queen Elizabeth—that we saw it coming: I’m
fond of citing my own 1993 article in which I warned of the dangers of
creating a monetary union without a banking union, not that this much
affected the course of events (Eichengreen 1993).
This decision to go ahead with the euro is another example of
the misuses of history—in this case, of the ability of policymakers to
cherry-pick their historical analogies. They argued that financial instability and even World War II, indirectly, had been caused by the competitive devaluations of the 1930s, and not by the rigid gold standard
system that preceded them, implying that the risk in the 1990s was
competitive devaluations rather than the premature creation of a new
gold-standard-like system. John F. Kennedy, when contemplating how
to respond to the Cuban Missile crisis, considered a range of historical
analogies, from Pearl Harbor to the 1948–1949 Berlin Blockade and the
1956 Suez Crisis, and tested them for fitness to the situation at hand.
Exceptionally, he had historians like Arthur Schlesinger in his kitchen
cabinet (much as Barack Obama had Christina Romer). Harry Truman,
who relied only on the analogy with Munich, did not. He had one analogy and pushed it for all it was worth. So too did the architects of the
Maastricht Treaty.
The analogy between the gold standard and the euro system became
clearer with the onset of the euro crisis, triggered by revelations about
Greece’s debt and deficits in late 2009. Just as the gold standard prevented national governments and monetary authorities from responding in the 1930s in stabilizing ways, it now became clear that the euro
system posed similar obstacles.24 That earlier conflict had been resolved
by abandoning the gold standard, leading many observers to predict that
this one would be similarly resolved by abandoning the euro.25
This, it turned out, was another misreading of history. In the 1930s,
when governments abandoned the gold standard, international trade
and lending had already all but collapsed. This time, in contrast, European countries did just enough to avoid that fate. Hence the euro had to
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be defended in order to preserve the single-market and intra-European
trade and payments. In the 1930s, political solidarity was another early
casualty of the Depression (Clavin 2010). Notwithstanding the strains
of the crisis, governments this time continued to consult and collaborate. All complaints about the European Union notwithstanding, 60
years of European integration fostered a degree of political solidarity
considerably greater than that of the 1930s. EU countries in a strong
economic and financial position provided loans to their weak European
partners. Those loans could have been larger, but they were large by the
standards of the 1930s (Accominotti and Eichengreen, forthcoming).
Here, then, is another case where the history of the 1930s was an
imperfect guide to policy outcomes. Where the earlier crisis led to the
collapse of the gold standard, the recent one has not led to the collapse
of the eurozone. At least not yet.

Notes
This chapter draws on my book Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, the Great
Recession, and the Uses—and Misuses—of History (Eichengreen 2015a). The informal
and personal tone of this chapter consciously reflects the lecture format for which it
was prepared.
1. There is by now an abundant literature by foreign policy specialists making this
point. See, for example, Eichengreen (2012), Kyong (1965), Lawrence (2014),
May (1973), Neustadt and May (1986), and Shinko (1994).
2. For anticipations of the fact, see Bernanke (2001) and Romer (1992).
3. On psychological biases in general, there is Kahneman (2011).
4. That Friedman and Schwartz in particular had said relatively little about the onset
of the Depression was a subtext of Peter Temin’s influential book (1976). One
important contribution that did discuss the run-up to the Depression at length was
that of Temin’s MIT colleague Charles Kindleberger (1973). Another noteworthy
if only partially successful attempt to develop this aspect of the story is Bernstein
(1989).
5. There were rare exceptions, to be sure; see, for example, White (1984).
6. For an attempt to do so after the fact, see Accomminotti and Eichengreen (2016).
7. An early recognition of the point as it applies to the recent crisis is Kohn (2009).
8. See Bernanke (2010) and associated discussion as cited in Pazzanghera (2010).
See also the discussion in Geithner (2014).
9. For perspectives on the Lehman Brothers story, see Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), MacDonald and Robinson (2010), and Sorkin (2010).
10. For details on this crisis, see Kennedy (1973) and Wicker (1996).
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11. This was the emphasis of Friedman and Schwartz’s influential Monetary History
(1963).
12. Although it did own an online bank, Lehman Brothers Bank FSB offered community banking services in Delaware, not that this played a key role in the parent
institution’s failure.
13. Former AIG CEO Maurice (“Hank”) Greenberg eventually filed a lawsuit against
the federal government disputing the terms of the bailout. At the time of writing,
closing arguments were still pending; see Milford and Zajac (2015).
14. As described in the chapter of the same title in Brown (2010).
15. The literature on the impact of these policies is large and characterized by controversy. Among the definitive studies in my view are Feyrer and Sacerdote (2011),
Joyce et al. (2011), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Mian and Sufi
(2012), and Pesaran and Smith (2012).
16. For the current recovery in historical perspective, see Reinhart and Rogoff (2014).
17. Estimates of such impacts differ, of course. A dispassionate analysis, if there is
such a thing, is Whalen (2015). The best European equivalent of which I am aware
is Barrell, Holland, and Hurst (2012).
18. The literature on fiscal consolidation in Europe is controversial, to put an understated gloss on the point. A meta-analysis of the literature can be found in Gechert,
Hughes-Hallett, and Rannenberg (2015).
19. A retrospective analysis with whose conclusions I broadly concur is Rosengren
(2015).
20. On Trichet and ECB policy, see Irwin (2015).
21. See the letter from 24 eminent economists published in the Wall Street Journal
(2010).
22. This is another context in which we are now likely to write the history of the 1920s
differently having lived through our own crisis and discovered how difficult it is
to track the development of contemporaneous conditions in real time; we are thus
likely to better appreciate how contemporaries similarly lacked adequate information on how quickly the economy was in fact contracting in the final months of
1929.
23. A more systematic comparison of financial reform following the two crises is
Eichengreen (2015b).
24. A good scholarly analysis is O’Rourke and Taylor (2013).
25. See, for example, O’Brien (2013).
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The Great Recession and
Lessons for Policymaking
Gary Burtless
Brookings Institution

This chapter addresses a straightforward question: What policy lessons can we draw from the Great Recession? At the time of this writing
in late 2014, the lessons have more academic than practical interest
to policymakers in Washington. Most decision-makers are more concerned about the next election than they are about warnings from an
experience that is unlikely to soon be repeated. However, examining
the experience may be useful when considering policies to prevent or
manage a future downturn.
The Great Recession produced the worst economic slump since the
Great Depression. Compared with other post–World War II recessions,
the one in 2008–2009 was particularly severe and the recovery from it
unusually sluggish. This is clear from a glance at job market statistics:
the spike in the unemployment rate—5.5 percentage points between
the first half of 2007 and October 2009—was the biggest the country experienced in the postwar era; the persistence of high joblessness
was uncommonly severe; and the unemployment rate remained above
8 percent for 43 consecutive months. The only postwar rival in terms
of severity was the recession during the Reagan administration, which
began in the summer of 1981. The unemployment rate in the 1980s
remained above 8 percent for only 27 consecutive months.
The consequences of the Great Recession for job losers and new job
entrants were unusually harsh. Over the entire postwar era before the
Great Recession, the median duration of unemployment reached a peak
of just 12.3 weeks, which occurred in May 1983 during the recovery
from the Reagan recession. In the recent slump, the median duration
of unemployment reached a peak more than twice as high, 25 weeks,
and it remained above 13 weeks for an astonishing 67 consecutive
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months. The BLS employment report for November 2014 showed that
the median unemployment duration for that month fell below 13 weeks
for the first time since March 2009.
As painful as it was, however, the Great Recession was not remotely
as severe as the Great Depression, which was “great” in its depth and
duration. The peak unemployment rate in the 1930s was 25 percent,
compared to just 10 percent during and after the Great Recession.
Between the fall of 1929 and the spring of 1933, the U.S. economy
shrank for 43 consecutive months, whereas in the recent recession the
economy shrank for just 18 months. At the end of the 1929–1933 downturn, real GDP per person was about 29 percent smaller than it was just
before the Depression began (Figure 3.1), compared to about 5 percent
between 2007 and 2009. In the Great Depression, per capita GDP did
not return to its pre-Depression level until 1937, a span of eight years; it
Figure 3.1 U.S. Gross Domestic Product per Person in the Great
Depression and Great Recession
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took a little less than five years after the Great Recession for per capita
GDP to surpass its prerecession peak.
The Great Depression saw personal consumption per person fall 21
percent below its pre-Depression level. In the worst year of the Depression, the typical American consumed about one-fifth fewer goods and
services than in the last pre-Depression year. In the Great Recession,
per capita real consumption fell just 4 percent. Whatever the shortcomings of macroeconomic policymaking in recent years, the fact is that
the U.S. economy performed far better between 2007 and 2014 than it
did in the decade that began in 1929. U.S. macro policies in the recent
downturn also delivered better results than the ones devised by policymakers in most other rich countries. Nonetheless, “It could have been
worse” is not a winning political slogan, a fact emphatically confirmed
by U.S. voters in the three elections after the recovery began. “It could
have been worse” is, however, a fair assessment of fiscal policymaking over the past seven years. The question this chapter poses is, “How
could it have been better?”

BACKGROUND
The federal government did not stand still in the face of the severe
contraction in late 2008. It dealt promptly with the financial crisis that
triggered the downturn. In fact, the rescue of ailing financial institutions
was mostly accomplished within a year after the worst phase of the
crisis. My critique focuses mostly on fiscal rather than monetary policy.
Fiscal policy is where U.S. policymakers, as well as those in much of
the industrialized world, fell furthest below the mark. Still, it is worth
remembering that an emergency law passed by Congress in October
2008 and an extraordinary series of steps by the Federal Reserve Board
(Fed) in 2008 and early 2009 were needed to keep the U.S. financial
system functioning.
Monetary Policy
Already worried by signs of financial market instability, the Fed
began to cut short-term interest rates in the summer of 2007, when the
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economy was still growing and the stock market climbing. By May 2008,
the central bank reduced its policy interest rate from 5.25 percent to 2.0
percent. On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers, the nation’s fourthlargest investment bank, declared bankruptcy. The bank’s collapse triggered a worldwide panic and started the worst phase of the financial
crisis. In response, the Federal Reserve lowered its policy interest rate
still further. By the end of 2008 the federal funds rate, which is the interest rate banks use to make overnight loans to one another, was cut to its
lowest level of the modern era. In the 16 months after August 2007, the
Fed cut its benchmark short-term rate by 5.1 points, to essentially zero.
The Fed also extended extraordinary credits to both banks and nonbank institutions in exchange for high-quality collateral. This emergency measure was needed to keep credit flowing in markets where
ordinary lending had practically ceased. Without this step many solvent
financial and nonfinancial companies would have been forced to either
enter bankruptcy or sharply curtail their normal operations. Many firms
would have been cut off from routine short-term borrowing. By keeping credit flowing in the middle of a panic, the Fed kept the financial
market crisis from metastasizing into something much worse. The real
economy took a beating, but if credit markets had completely seized up,
the damage could have been catastrophic. Providing liquidity in a crisis
is a classic role of a well-functioning central bank.
When the Fed pushed its policy interest rate to zero in late 2008, it
exhausted the standard measures used by central banks to encourage
borrowing and spur growth. With safe, short-term interest rates close to
zero, the Fed either had to watch from the sidelines or take unconventional steps to encourage lending and borrowing. One of the main tools
it used after late 2008 was quantitative easing. This strategy involves
the Fed’s purchase of longer-term Treasury securities than it ordinarily holds, as well as purchases of private market securities, including
mortgage-backed securities. These purchases can potentially reduce
market interest rates on intermediate- and longer-term private securities. Through the fall of 2014 the Fed purchased $1.6 trillion in Treasury
bonds and $1.7 trillion in mortgage-backed securities in three different
sequences, all in an effort to push down intermediate- and long-term
interest rates.
The logic behind this strategy is that by reducing longer-term interest rates the Fed might encourage some consumers and firms who oth-
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erwise would not have borrowed funds to do so. Their borrowing can in
turn give a boost to business investment, new home building, and purchases of consumer durable goods, such as cars. Experts on monetary
policy, consumer spending, and business investment have not reached a
consensus on whether this policy has worked. What seems clear is that
the Fed was pushed to adopt unconventional policies because Congress
failed to adopt a fiscal policy that is appropriate when the economy is
operating far below its potential and when short-term interest rates on
safe securities are close to zero.
Fiscal Policy
With prodding from two presidents, Congress authorized a series of
fiscal policy measures to boost consumer incomes, induce businesses to
expand investment, and protect state-level spending on health, education, and public infrastructure. Most of the special government measures in response to the Great Recession were familiar ones: Temporary tax reductions to boost consumer incomes and encourage business
investment; extensions of unemployment benefits and liberalization of
other government transfer programs, including food stamps and social
assistance; and increased federal appropriations for new government
investment in buildings, roads, and science and technology projects.
The special fiscal measures included some unusual measures as well.
For the first time, the federal government paid for generous insurance
subsidies for laid-off workers who lost health insurance when they lost
their jobs. It also provided unusually liberal grants to state governments
to encourage them to maintain or increase spending on core state obligations, such as K–12 education and health care for the indigent. President Obama used funds authorized under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to finance emergency lending and fast-track bankruptcy
funding to preserve General Motors, Chrysler, and many auto supply
companies. A small share of emergency stimulus appropriations was
used to fund or provide loans to projects aimed at improving energy
efficiency and reducing carbon emissions.
It should be emphasized that an overwhelming percentage of stimulus dollars was spent on programs that would have been familiar to policymakers and economists in every recession since the early 1960s. This
is true whether the administration was Democratic or Republican, liberal
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or conservative. This is also true whether Congress was controlled by
Democrats or Republicans, liberals or conservatives. The emphasis and
overall scale of stimulus programs have differed depending on the political leanings of the party in control of Congress and the White House.
However, Republican and conservative critics of recent fiscal policy are
kidding themselves (and voters) when they claim to be horrified by the
actual contents and additions to the deficit connected with the stimulus.
Republicans were in control of either the White House or Congress (or
both) in recessions in the mid-1970s, in the early 1980s, in 2001–2003,
and in 2008. Many elements of the stimulus program adopted in 2009
and 2010 were also present in the fiscal policies adopted in those recessions—notably, big tax cuts, generous extensions of unemployment
benefits, and extra outlays on public capital investment. In 2008–2009
the scale and speed of the additions to peacetime deficits were unprecedented, to be sure. But that is because after Lehman Brothers entered
bankruptcy the nation faced the frightening prospect of financial market
collapse. Even though the risk was reduced to a manageable level by
spring 2009, the effects of the financial crisis on the real economy were
obvious, severe, and still growing well into 2010.
The fact that most postwar administrations and Congresses would
have pursued the same or a similar set of stimulus policies has not altered
a basic reality. The popular political reaction to some of the best-known
policies has been intensely hostile. In particular, the financial rescue of
the nation’s biggest banks and automakers inspired widespread public
indignation. The federal bailout of big banks appeared to reward firms
whose imprudent, even reckless behavior helped to create the crisis.
Many voters may have incorrectly believed that an overwhelming share
of public funds used to restore the economy was spent on bailouts for
big banks and automakers. In fact, far more resources were devoted to
temporary tax cuts for middle-income families, emergency relief for
laid-off workers and their families, and generous grants to state and
local governments. The confusion is understandable. After Democrats
gained control of both the White House and Congress in January 2009,
Republican opponents of fiscal stimulus were unrelenting in their criticism of selected components of the countercyclical program. Many
liberal Democrats joined Republicans in fiercely criticizing the aid
extended to big financial institutions. Voters may have wrongly inferred
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that the controversial parts of the stimulus package consumed an outsized share of the program’s cost.
The extreme and unbending hostility of political opponents to the
fiscal measures has had practical consequences. First, fierce opposition
from conservatives, including a handful of fiscally conservative Democrats, deterred the administration from proposing a stimulus package
that was adequate given the magnitude of the shock to the economy.
This opposition reduced the size of the stimulus the administration
could persuade Congress to pass. Second, Republican gains in the
House of Representatives in the 2010 election led to an unwinding of
fiscal stimulus long before the economy had recovered from the recession. This was the single worst error in macroeconomic policymaking
following the financial crisis in fall 2008. The fact that policymakers in
other rich countries made even worse errors in both fiscal and monetary
policy does not excuse the fiscal policy errors of U.S. decision makers.
For reasons that may seem mysterious to future economic historians,
members of Congress, opinion leaders, and ultimately voters decided
that the “crisis” of rising public debt represented a more pressing challenge to the nation than soaring long-term unemployment and the underutilization of U.S. productive capacity. There is no evidence that people
who buy and sell securities ever shared the view that the United States
was accumulating an unsustainable debt burden. The government was
able to sell indexed and unindexed short- and long-term Treasury at
historically low interest rates throughout the crisis and its aftermath.
Nonetheless, the fear of rising national debt pushed opinion leaders to
urge Congress to adopt a more conservative fiscal policy after 2009
than would have seemed appropriate based on the historical record
from 1929 to 2007.
Fortunately, the private economy began to grow again in late 2009,
and between 2010 and 2014, private sector payrolls grew faster than
200,000 a month. Unfortunately, the downturn was severe, and the
growing working-age population needs 75,000 net new jobs every
month just to keep the unemployment rate from rising. For the past four
years, public sector spending and hiring have done little to speed the
pace of recovery. In fact, in the three years through 2013, a drop in public employee payrolls offset about 6 percent of the job gains generated
in the private sector. Reductions in public payrolls and also in govern-
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ment consumption and investment created unnecessary headwinds for
a weak recovery.
Sharp Downturn, Weak Recovery
The labor market effects of the 2008–2009 recession were severe
compared with those of any other postwar recession. More disturbingly,
the recovery was unusually slow. It is enlightening to compare the recent
recession with the one that began in 1981, which was the worst postwar
downturn before the Great Recession. Figure 3.2 shows the trend in the
unemployment rate before and after the onset of the two recessions. The
unemployment rate in each case is measured relative to the rate at the
business cycle peak as designated by the National Bureau of Economic
Research.1 The business cycle peak is indicated on the horizontal axis
by “0” and other months by the number of months before or after the
business cycle peak. The chart tracks the difference between the unemFigure 3.2 Change in Unemployment Rate in Two Postwar Recessions
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ployment rate in the indicated month and the rate at the business cycle
peak. The estimates show unemployment changes in the year before the
recession began up through the eighty-second month after the previous
business cycle peak. The 1981–1982 recession initially saw a steeper
rise in the unemployment rate. Slightly more than a year after the onset
of the recession, however, the increase in joblessness was greater in
the Great Recession, and the unemployment rate continued to rise for
22 months rather than just 16. Crucially, the decline in joblessness has
been much slower in the most recent business cycle. By the thirtyfifth month, unemployment was back to its prerecession level in the
1981–1982 downturn but was still 4.8 percentage points higher than the
prerecession level in the Great Recession. By the eighty-second month
after the beginning of the Great Recession, unemployment was still 0.8
percentage points higher than it was when the recession began. At the
comparable point after the Reagan recession, the jobless rate was 1.6
points below where it was when the recession began.
Figure 3.3 shows the same kind of comparison for the decline
and recovery of payroll employment in the two recessions. The drop
in employment was initially more severe in the 1981–1982 recession,
but by the thirteenth month after the downturn began the percentage
drop in payroll employment was greater in the Great Recession. In the
eighteenth month after the onset of the 1981–1982 recession, employment began to recover. Employment did not begin to climb in the Great
Recession until the twenty-eighth month after the business cycle peak
in late 2007. By the eighty-second month after the beginning of the
recession, payroll employment in the 1981–1982 recession was 14.6
percent above its prerecession peak. In the same month of the most
recent business cycle, employment was only 0.8 percentage points
above its prerecession peak. Not only were the labor market effects of
the recent recession deeper than those of any other postwar recession,
they have also lingered much longer.
Why Was the Recovery So Weak?
The key event that triggered the steep slide in the 2008 economy
was the near-death experience of the biggest U.S. financial institutions.
Their brush with disaster interrupted normal credit flows and, more to
the point, made credit-worthy households and businesses worry about
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Figure 3.3 Change in Total Payroll Employment in Two
Postwar Recessions
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their future access to credit. Investors and businesses fled riskier assets
and bid up the prices of the safest assets, particularly U.S. government
debt.
The underlying cause of financial institutions’ weakness can be
traced to the run-up in house and apartment prices followed by the steep
slide in many parts of the country. The rise in prices encouraged households to borrow and increase their consumption more than they would
have done based on their incomes alone. The accelerating decline in
house prices after 2006 wiped out much or all of this extra wealth and
simultaneously destroyed the credit-worthiness of a large percentage
of households. Between 2007 and 2009 the combined effects of declining real estate and stock market prices erased $19 trillion of household
wealth—one-quarter of household net worth at the peak. This drop in
wealth would be expected to reduce household consumption by $450
billion a year if we assume, conservatively, that households boost
annual consumption by $4 for every $100 increase in their net worth.
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If many consumers spend an even larger percentage of their net gains
from house price gains, the combined drop in house and stock prices
would reduce consumer spending by $750 billion per year.2
Figure 3.4 shows the rise and subsequent fall in home prices compared with all other prices in the U.S. economy. Between the late 1990s
and 2006, house prices increased by half relative to other prices; by
2012 they lost about six-tenths of that gain. Between 2006 and the end
of 2012, they fell one-quarter. Since many homeowners had borrowed
heavily either to buy their homes or to convert their capital gains into
ready spending money, a large percentage of them ended up with negative equity in their homes. If they also saw their incomes drop as a result
of a bad job market, they simultaneously faced the risk of losing possession of their homes.
The surge in house prices between 2003 and 2006 was accompanied
by a strong rise in stock prices. Appreciating stock values helped boost
Figure 3.4 Index of Real U.S. House Prices, 1975–2014, Q1
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consumption among households that owned equities. When equity
owners lost faith in U.S. financial institutions and then in the companies
that depended on them, stock prices plunged. Equity prices fell about
half between the fall of 2007 and the first quarter of 2009. The collapse
of stock prices affected the net worth of a different group of households
than those suffering sharp losses as a result of the housing collapse.
Stockholders tend to be considerably richer on average than the typical
homeowner. Nonetheless, wealthy Americans also consume, and their
consumption is affected by the value of their wealth holdings.
The best summary measure of American’s wealth holdings is the
ratio of their household net worth to their disposable income. This ratio
reached a peak of 6.5-to-1 in 2006 and then fell back to 5-to-1 in early
2009 (Figure 3.5). The deflation of the house price bubble, the loss of
confidence in major financial institutions, and collapsing stock market valuations erased one-quarter of net household wealth. After 2007
consumption was no longer being turbo-charged by soaring household
wealth; it was being pushed down by the drop in household net worth.
Most large nonfinancial businesses entered the recession with reasonably strong balance sheets. Except for short-term borrowing needs,
many of them did not have a pressing need for credit to maintain their
operations. But to persuade a business to invest, the business owner must
also be persuaded that there will be a market for the added output that
would be produced by new investment. Business managers and owners
read the same news stories as the rest of us—after Lehman Brothers’
collapse, they faced the chilling prospect of consumer retrenchment.
The drop in home prices extinguished many families’ chances for
added borrowing. But even families with ample wealth faced the reality
that not only was their net worth no longer rising, it was sinking fast.
In this environment, households consumed less, businesses sold less,
and sensible business managers anticipated that household spending
would remain low, erasing the potential payoff from new investment.
If a firm is already operating at 30 percent below capacity, why spend
funds to expand that capacity? Even with short- and intermediate-term
interest rates at historical lows, the attractions of additional investment
appeared meager.
The outlook improved when stock prices recovered and home prices
began to rise again. Even so, the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer
Finances suggests that average household net worth for middle- and

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be
set to Always in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your
Customer Service Representative if you have questions about fnding this option.

Job Name:

--

/402798t

The Great Recession and Lessons for Policymaking 41
Figure 3.5 Ratio of Net Household Wealth to Household Disposable
Income, 1974–2014, Q2
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lower-income families was lower in late 2014 than it was in the late
1980s.3 The top wealth holders are undoubtedly much better off today
than they were in the aftermath of the Great Recession, but the same
is not true of lower-income households whose 2007 wealth consisted
mainly of the equity in their homes.
The dismal employment numbers I cite above, combined with
appalling wealth losses, may lead some readers to wonder why per
capita consumption fell “only” 4 percent from its peak prerecession
level to its low point in the Great Recession. One answer is that the
U.S. social safety net worked very well in the Great Recession. When
we entered the recession, neither the Congress nor the president was
interested in dismantling the safety net. In fact, President Obama and
the 2009–2010 Congress enacted important and permanent additions
to the safety net. Furthermore, Congress and two administrations acted
promptly to shore up consumer incomes through a range of temporary
tax cuts and enhancements of the safety net.
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Even if policymakers do not act to boost the economy in a recession, the nation’s permanent tax and transfer system has built-in stabilizers that automatically lessen the income losses suffered by the unemployed. Quantitatively, the biggest single item is federal tax payments,
especially payroll and personal and corporate income taxes, which
tend to fall faster than private incomes when recessions cause pretax
incomes to shrink.
The second-biggest item is unemployment benefits. Experienced
workers who lose their jobs through no fault of their own ordinarily
qualify for up to six months of Unemployment Insurance benefits. In
recessions, benefits can last longer depending on the severity of unemployment in a job loser’s state of residence. Although U.S. unemployment benefits are low compared to those available in most other
wealthy countries, workers earning the average wage typically qualify
for benefits that compensate them for half the loss of their prelayoff
earnings.4 Because the number of laid-off workers qualifying for benefits rises steeply in a recession, the money spent on jobless benefits also
increases sharply. In every recession since the late 1950s, Congress has
authorized temporary emergency extensions of unemployment benefits,
financed with federal funds. It did so again in 2008 and 2009, increasing
the maximum duration of unemployment benefits to 99 weeks in states
with the highest unemployment rates. In no previous recession had
Congress authorized such a lengthy extension of benefits. In addition,
Congress financed a temporary increase in weekly unemployment benefit checks, and it reduced the income tax levied on benefits. Between
2007 and 2010, annual outlays on unemployment benefits increased
more than 4.5 times, rising from $35 billion to $160 billion.
In addition to temporary improvements in unemployment benefits, the federal government also authorized increases in monthly food
stamp allotments, extra funding for state governments’ social assistance
programs for children, and a doubling of the prerecession budget for
training the unemployed and hard-to-employ. Congress also enacted
temporary measures to cut household payroll and income tax payments.
For example, it increased the Earned Income and Child Tax Credits,
and it authorized a temporary payroll tax credit of $400 per worker and
$800 per couple in 2009 and 2010, with the credit phased out for upper
income families. When the temporary tax cuts ended in 2011, they were
replaced by a temporary cut in the Social Security payroll tax of 2 per-
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centage points. Many low- and moderate-income families do not owe
income or payroll taxes, and consequently did not benefit under these
provisions. For some of these families—in particular, those receiving
Social Security and veterans’ benefits—the 2009 stimulus bill granted
one-time payments in lieu of the tax cuts.
Automatic income stabilization combined with generous temporary
measures to shore up household income achieved their intended aim:
Household net income fell proportionately far less than the drop in private income. This is illustrated in Figure 3.6, which shows the 2007–
2014 trends in gross market income and disposable personal income.
Trends in both income series are measured on a per capita basis as a
percentage of estimated incomes in the fourth quarter of 2007, the last
calendar quarter of the economic expansion that ended in 2007. Incomes
in each period are converted into constant purchasing power units using
the personal consumption expenditure deflator. The line in the chart
Figure 3.6 Impact of the Great Recession on Pretax Market Income and
Disposable Income, 2007Q1–2014Q3
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shows the trend in pretax market income per person. Market income
consists of gross labor compensation to employees, self-employment
income of business owners, interest, dividends, rental payments, and
other flows of pretax capital income. Per capita market income fell
sharply in the recession, declining 8.8 percent by the first quarter of
2010. Spendable income, indicated by the bars in Figure 3.6, fell proportionately much less. Increases in government transfers and reduced
personal taxes cushioned households’ income loss. In the period with
the worst income loss, the first quarter of 2010, disposable income per
person was only 1.5 percent below its level at the end of the previous
expansion.
Figure 3.7 compares the trend in pretax market income with changes
in the level of government transfers per person. The bars in the chart
show the level of real government transfers per person, measured as
a percentage of transfers per person in the final quarter of 2007. Note
Figure 3.7 Trends in Pretax Market Income and Government Transfer
Payments, 2007Q1–2014Q3
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the steep increase in transfers starting as early as the second quarter
of 2008, when the Bush administration and Congress enacted the first
countercyclical stimulus program. By the second quarter of 2009,
transfer payments per person were 20 percent higher than in the quarter
before the recession began.
Now consider all three components of disposable personal income,
shown in Figure 3.8: 1) pretax market income (wages, fringe benefits,
self-employment earnings, rent, interest, and dividends); 2) direct tax
payments to the government (mainly social insurance and personal
income tax payments); and 3) transfer payments received from the
government. Measuring each of these variables relative to their levels
in the last quarter of 2007, the trend lines in the chart show how per
capita amounts changed over the period from 2007 through 2014:Q3.
As a result of progressive income taxation and the temporary tax cuts
effective over the period 2008–2012, personal tax payments fell, both
Figure 3.8 Components of Real Disposable Personal Income per Person,
2007Q1–2014Q3
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absolutely and as a percentage of households’ pretax incomes. By the
third quarter of 2009, per capita tax payments fell almost 20 percent,
about twice the proportional drop in pretax market income. The temporary tax cuts were phased out at the end of 2012, so the trend in
tax payments after that year mirrors the trend in pretax market income.
As noted above, the increase in real government transfers per person
has not yet been phased out. Transfer payments continue to supplement
family incomes more than they did before the Great Recession.
In view of the sharp increase in transfer income and the sizable temporary cuts in personal taxes, it should not be surprising that personal
consumption fell much less than market income in the Great Recession,
a pattern highlighted in Figure 3.9. The line in the figure traces the
trend in pretax market income per person. Note that per capita market
income fell nearly 9 percent between 2007 and the first quarter of 2010.
The bars in the chart show the trend in real consumption expenditures
per person, measured as a percent of the personal consumption level
in the last quarter before the recession. Even at the worst point in the
recession, the second quarter of 2009, personal consumption fell just
4 percent—a larger drop than the one we observed in per capita disposable income (see Figure 3.6). It is, however, far smaller than the
drop in pretax market income. The stimulus program combined with
automatic stabilizers undoubtedly worked in the sense that they dramatically reduced the decline in spendable incomes. By helping to hold
up spendable income, they also lessened the drop in consumer expenditures. Recall that household net worth fell one-quarter while household
market incomes fell one-eleventh. It represents a considerable achievement that per capita, real consumption fell only 4 percent below its
previous peak in the worst quarter of the Great Recession.
The changes in tax burdens and in government transfers tended to
favor low- and middle-income families, especially those with a laid-off
worker, over families with higher incomes. The Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) publishes periodic analyses of the distribution of federal
tax burdens (e.g., CBO [2014]). The analyses distinguish three definitions of income: gross market incomes (including capital gains and an
imputation to households of the undistributed income of corporations in
which they have ownership share); pretax income (gross market income
plus government transfers); and after-tax income (pretax income minus
federal taxes, including payroll, income, and excise taxes). The most

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be
set to Always in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your
Customer Service Representative if you have questions about fnding this option.

Job Name:

--

/402798t

The Great Recession and Lessons for Policymaking 47
Figure 3.9 Trends in Pretax Market Income and Personal Consumption
Expenditures per Person, 2007Q1–2014Q3
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recent published CBO data cover the period from 1979 through 2011,
and they permit us to determine how incomes under these three definitions differ across the household income distribution and over time.
CBO’s results for the period 2007–2011 permit us to see how gross
market income and after-tax income (including government transfers)
changed in different positions of the income distribution. Figure 3.10
shows the 2007–2011 change in pretax market income and after-tax
income across the distribution. Households are ranked by the CBO
based on their pretax market plus transfer income. Panel A shows percent changes in pretax market incomes; Panel B shows percent changes
in after-tax incomes. Results on the left show income changes in the
bottom four-fifths of the income distribution; results on the right show
changes in the top fifth of the distribution. The latter results are subdivided into results for the 81st–90th income percentile, the 91st–95th
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Figure 3.10 Estimates of Changes in Market Income and Posttax,
Posttransfer Income by Position in Household Income
Distribution, 2007–2011
Panel A: Percent change in market income
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percentile, the 96th–99th percentile, and the top 1 percent of pretax
income recipients.
The biggest income losses were sustained by households in the top
1 percent of the income distribution. Those households saw a 27 percent drop in both their pre- and posttax incomes. In all other income
groups the proportional drop in posttax, posttransfer income was substantially smaller than the drop in gross market income. Lower taxes
and higher transfer payments erased all the market income losses suffered by households in the bottom two-fifths of the income distribution. According to CBO’s estimates, households in the bottom one-fifth
of the income distribution saw a small rise in their after-tax incomes
even though they suffered an 8 percent drop in their average market
incomes. (The CBO estimates show, however, that households in the
bottom income group derive a large share of their total income from
public transfers.) Middle- and lower-middle-income households saw
large declines in their pretax market incomes, but when tax reductions
and increased government transfers are taken into account, the percentage loss in net income was far smaller. Only near the top of the income
distribution did households experience proportional losses in their
after-tax incomes that were comparable to the reductions in their market incomes. The CBO income analysis thus confirms a little-known
fact: The nation’s social safety net as well as the special fiscal measures
enacted early in the Great Recession offset a sizable fraction of the
market income losses suffered by Americans in the bottom 95 percent
of the income distribution. Even though many voters appear to have
missed this beneficent effect of the stimulus program, the reduction in
spendable income losses represents a signal achievement of U.S. fiscal
policy in the Great Recession.

HOW DID FISCAL POLICY FAIL?
If fiscal policy succeeded in offsetting much of the market income
loss suffered by lower- and middle-income Americans, it nonetheless
failed to create buoyant demand for goods and services produced in
the United States. This failure is almost certainly connected to the fact
that, even in the winter of 2009, few policymakers or public or pri-
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vate forecasters anticipated the severity of the Great Recession. The
United States had experienced severe recessions in the earlier postwar
period—notably in 1974–1976 and 1980–1983—and it had seen weak
recoveries after both the 1990 and 2001 recessions. But never before
in the postwar period did the nation experience a severe recession followed by a painfully slow recovery. The Great Recession combined
these two elements. Even in winter 2009, forecasters in the private sector, the CBO, the Federal Reserve, and the new Obama administration
substantially underestimated the severity of the recession.5 Their prediction errors were understandable—after all, they were based on the
experience of other recessions in the postwar era.
The forecasting errors had unfortunate consequences. Because the
reality turned out to be considerably worse than the forecast, naïve or
unscrupulous critics tended to blame the disappointing outcome on the
policies adopted by Congress and the Obama administration. As critics correctly pointed out, the actual trend in both output and employment turned out worse than the administration forecast. But rather than
draw the correct inference—the downturn was worse than forecasters
believed based on preliminary and incomplete statistics—critics of U.S.
policy reached the profoundly wrong conclusion that countercyclical
fiscal and monetary policy produced the disappointing shortfall.
Prudent policymakers, even if they accepted the consensus forecast,
should have formulated a Plan B. They should have asked, “Suppose
the outcome is much worse than we expect? Suppose unemployment
rises more than forecast and payrolls rebound more slowly?” Under
those circumstances, we should have expected long-term unemployment to increase substantially. Past experience shows that employers
are reluctant to hire the long-term unemployed as long as there are
plenty of short-term unemployed and new job seekers in the applicant
queue. What policies would help deal with the swelling number of longterm unemployed? I do not think influential policymakers ever devised
a Plan B. Once it was clear in summer 2009 that the financial system
was on the road to recovery, the sense of crisis passed.
Some economists in the administration and many more who were
advising Republican presidential aspirants and members of Congress
turned to the task of trimming the deficit. They thought the crisis was
over. For the growing number of long-term unemployed and the mil-
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lions who would eventually join their ranks, a weak job market was or
would become the central problem of their economic lives.
The simple explanation for stubbornly high unemployment was
that there was too little aggregate demand for goods and services produced in the United States. The drop in overall demand due to shrunken
household wealth, the sharp fall-off in the demand for new homes, and
weaker business demand for new investment caused labor demand
to fall far below the level needed to produce full employment. Using
conventional monetary policy tools, there was little the Fed could do
to boost demand once interest rates on safe short-term securities fell
almost to zero. The usual policy remedy when the nation has exhausted
standard monetary policy tools is to use fiscal policy to lift overall
demand. The U.S. government boosted fiscal stimulus in 2008–2010
and then began to reduce that stimulus though the unemployment rate
remained above 8 percent through August 2012.
Ingredients of Plan B
A more sensible policy would have aimed at boosting the demand
for jobless workers well past the date when Congress began cutting the
fiscal stimulus. Since voters and lawmakers were concerned about additions to the national debt, fiscal policy should have focused on reducing
the country’s underemployment problem. This means that every $100
added to the national debt to finance the plan should have increased by
at least $100 the amount employers spent on wages and fringe benefits
of workers residing in this country. Boosting transfer payments to persons and cutting business and consumer taxes are not the most reliable
ways to maximize the impact of additional public spending on labor
compensation.
Consumers whose disposable incomes are increased by a tax cut
may spend their extra incomes on goods produced in another country,
they may reduce their indebtedness, or they may increase their bank
balances. If financial institutions are unwilling to lend out the extra
deposits for current consumption or investment, the additional $100 in
federal debt accumulated to provide the tax cut will not yield an additional $100 of outlays on wages.
The same is true of tax cuts or benefit hikes that consumers use
to buy products produced in China, Thailand, or Germany. When we
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implement an emergency Plan B, it is with the understanding that we
are trying to extricate the U.S. economy from a serious domestic crisis.
We want the additions to debt to deal first and foremost with our domestic economic problem rather than the ones faced by the Chinese, Thai,
or German governments. After 2009, voters and members of Congress
became worried about the soaring national debt (wrongly, in my view).
If we want to economize on the additions to the national debt while
at the same time dealing with the shortfall in U.S. aggregate demand,
we should adopt emergency policies that maximize the employment
effect of each additional dollar of debt needed to deal with the shortfall.
Added debt-financed spending should reduce the number of involuntarily unemployed Americans as much as possible. When there is persistent excess unemployment and widespread fear of taking on added
debt, we want any additions to our debt to produce added labor income
for workers in the United States rather than in other countries.
What policies could have achieved this goal? Investing in additional new or refurbished public infrastructure seems like a promising
way to boost demand for U.S. workers. Both construction and durable
manufacturing were badly hurt by the downturn. Payroll employment
during the recession fell more than 20 percent in durable goods manufacturing and nearly 30 percent in the construction industry. Both industries were in fact already shrinking when the Great Recession began.
Skilled and unskilled workers in these industries could have been put to
work on useful public projects without depriving the private sector of
workers whose talents were in short supply. Private sector demand for
these workers was inadequate in 2009–2013 and remained inadequate
through 2014.
A federal policy of funding public infrastructure could only be
effective in reducing joblessness if employers added net new jobs that
otherwise would not have been created. A sizable share of public infrastructure is financed, built, or maintained by state and local governments. If the federal government provides $100 billion to state governments for new infrastructure investment, it should place restrictions
on the grants so states do not subtract $100 billion from infrastructure
investment they otherwise would have paid for themselves. Ensuring that grantees do not offset the intended effects of grants by undertaking less self-financed activity of the kind subsidized by the grants is
a well-known problem in public finance. How can the national govern-
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ment create incentives for state and local lawmakers to undertake new
activities on their own with their own resources? Some methods have
proven more effective than others. The federal government can place a
floor on states’ and localities’ own spending on the activity it is trying
to encourage. That floor can be linked to the prerecession level of state
and local spending on the activity. States can then be penalized with
reduced federal grant payments if state and local government outlays on
the activity drops beneath the specified floor. This method of incentivizing state lawmakers is particularly effective if the increase in federal
aid is expected to be temporary. Congress can also establish drop-dead
dates for the expenditure of emergency federal aid. For example, Congress could have required that federal aid appropriated and authorized
in 2009 must be spent no later than December 2013. Unexpended funds
would then be returned to the Treasury, which could redistribute the
funds to states that spent their stimulus grants on the designated activity
and on schedule.
Most voters may have been under the impression that, aside from
bank bailouts, the bulk of stimulus spending was devoted to infrastructure investment and maintenance projects. That is not the case. Consider
the programs authorized by Congress in February 2009 as part of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Figure 3.11 presents a three-way breakdown of the fund allocations. The bottom portion
of each bar shows the funds authorized for public infrastructure projects
or grants and tax incentives for businesses and nonprofit organizations
to invest in buildings and research and development. The appropriated
funds are divided into two time periods, fiscal years 2009–2010 and
2011–2019. An overwhelming share of the total funds were expected
to be spent in 2009–2010, that is, before October 2010. This is not the
case, however, for the funds slated for infrastructure and R&D investments. Most of those capital expenditures were expected to be spent
after 2010. These capital expenditures may be what many voters have
in mind when they refer to “stimulus spending.” In fact, such spending
was a minor part of the stimulus. The overwhelming share of stimulus funds were spent on temporary tax cuts and transfers to persons.
The share devoted to those items is indicated in the middle portion of
the bars. Actually, the chart understates the fraction of stimulus dollars
devoted to tax cuts and transfer benefit increases because it excludes
the sizable tax cuts and benefit improvements authorized in the last year
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Figure 3.11 Anticipated Stimulus Spending under the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 2009–2019
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of the Bush administration and in the months after February 2009. It
ignores all stimulus funds except those that were authorized under the
ARRA program. Virtually all of the non-ARRA stimulus spending took
the form of tax cuts and unemployment benefit expansions.
Why was so little money devoted to public capital projects, even
though these have powerful advantages in ensuring that funds are used
to buy goods and services produced in the United States? When the
stimulus program was authorized, the Obama administration and wellinformed members of Congress recognized they wanted the money to
be spent quickly, when the slump was actually in progress. Informed
policymakers were also aware of the difficulties of spending funds
quickly when the money is allocated to new or refurbished public capital projects. It is hard to come up with a controversy-free list of projects
on which to spend extra federal dollars. Even after a list of projects is
chosen, it may take many months or even years before the resources
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can be invested to complete the projects. States and local governments
may game the federal rules so they obtain fiscal relief with federal aid
rather than add to the number of worthwhile projects they undertake or
complete.
Delays in selecting and beginning capital projects will delay the
expenditure of capital project funds. Federal stimulus dollars may not
actually get spent until the economic emergency is past, at which point
the federal dollars will compete with private-sector dollars to obtain the
resources needed to complete the long-delayed projects. Skilled workers, expensive machinery, and experienced managers may be in short
supply when the federal aid dollars are finally spent. Instead of boosting
aggregate demand when the economy is far below full employment,
the funds may get spent when the economy is near full employment. In
short, funds will be spent too late to speed the recovery and just in time
to fuel inflation in a fully employed economy. In contrast, tax cuts and
transfer increases can be temporary and targeted on population groups
in greatest need of aid.
These are valid lessons from the nation’s post–World War II experience with countercyclical public works programs. They represent
costly and hard-won lessons, but they do not apply with much force
when policymakers are looking for a Plan B, a strategy that will reduce
excess unemployment when short-term interest rates are at or near zero.
In those circumstances, monetary policy will be less effective in bringing the economy closer to full employment. When the shortfall from
full employment is expected to last a long time, the advantages of a
temporary public works program seem compelling. Even if state and
local governments cannot immediately find or begin new shovel-ready
projects, they should be capable of finding and beginning them within a
couple of years. The limitations mentioned above might mean few dollars would have been spent on public capital projects in 2008 or 2009. As
it turned out, however, the U.S. job market still needed a sizable boost
in 2010—and in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. The majority of states and
thousands of local governments could have found worthwhile capital
projects on which to spend emergency federal aid dollars over such a
lengthy span of years. The risk that such a capital investment program
would have generated excess inflation now seems far-fetched, but even
if we assume that states only began spending their emergency public
works money when the recovery was nearly complete, policymakers
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can use many policy tools to reduce excess inflation. For example, the
Fed could raise short-term interest rates, or Congress could raise tax
rates or curb public spending on other discretionary budget items.
The third main budget category in the 2009 ARRA package was an
allocation to aid state and local governments. Those funds are indicated
by the top portion of the columns in Figure 3.11. The amount of money
allocated to state aid in 2009–2010 was twice the level allocated to
government capital projects and in research and development investment. Federal policymakers were worried in 2009 that a sharp decline
in state and local revenues would push local lawmakers to cut benefits
to the unemployed, trim health and education spending, and shrink public payrolls. The temporary fiscal relief from the federal government
was large enough to offset a quarter to a third of the expected state and
local budget imbalances that resulted from the recession. It is an open
question whether this aid to state and local governments was effective
in reducing employment losses in the downturn or in speeding growth
in the recovery. Years of careful research will be needed to determine
how states and localities spent the extra federal funds they received.
State and local public employee payrolls increased modestly through
the middle of 2010, and it seems likely these payroll gains would have
been smaller in the absence of the temporary federal aid. State and local
payrolls began to fall in 2010 at the same time private-sector employment began to recover. Public payrolls then continued to slide through
the end of 2013, offsetting about one-seventh of the employment gains
generated by private employers.
Figure 3.12 divides the ARRA stimulus package into the same three
categories described in Figure 3.11 and shows the timing of spending
on each item measured as a percentage of potential GDP in the indicated fiscal year. Total spending on the package was estimated to be
$835 billion spread over 10 years. Outlays were expected to peak in fiscal year 2010 and then slide steeply immediately thereafter. However,
Congress later authorized further extensions in unemployment benefits
and sizable (though shrinking) tax cuts after the expiration of those
authorized in ARRA. Nearly all the later stimulus packages either cut
Americans’ taxes (income taxes and Social Security payroll taxes) or
provided more generous unemployment benefits than are offered under
regular state programs. Congress failed to authorize any more capital
projects or additional fiscal relief for state and local governments. A
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Figure 3.12 Anticipated Stimulus Spending under the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 2009–2015
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visual adjustment in Figure 3.12 to reflect all the stimulus programs
through 2014 rather than just the spending authorized under ARRA
would show much higher funding in FYs 2011–2013 for direct income
assistance, provided largely in the form of tax cuts and unemployment
benefit increases.
The composition of spending authorized under the stimulus packages makes public hostility to the spending puzzling. In January 2010,
CNN conducted a poll asking Americans about their views of the
stimulus program passed less than a year earlier (CNN 2010). The poll
results showed that about 75 percent of Americans thought at least half
of the stimulus dollars were “wasted” and 45 percent thought “most” or
“nearly all” of the stimulus dollars had been wasted. When one considers how the stimulus outlays were allocated, this view seems extremely
odd. Most of the stimulus dollars were spent directly on them, that is,
the poll respondents themselves. By far the biggest slice of stimulus
outlays was devoted to personal income tax cuts (lower tax withhold-

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be
set to Always in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your
Customer Service Representative if you have questions about fnding this option.

Job Name:

--

/402798t

58 Burtless

ings or bigger refund checks). Lower direct taxes boosted after-tax
incomes for at least 80 percent of American households. Other portions
of the package funded extensions in unemployment benefits, hikes in
food stamps, and a variety of tax credits for low-income wage earners
or families rearing children. If these stimulus dollars were wasted, most
of the waste was being done by the poll respondents themselves.
Another slice of stimulus spending, at least in 2009 and 2010, went
to grants in aid for state spending on education and Medicaid. It is likely
that only part of this aid was used by states to increase or maintain their
spending on education and health benefits. A large portion was probably
used for general budgetary support and indirectly to help states avoid
imposing tax hikes. If polling respondents were correct and “more than
half” or “nearly all” of these stimulus dollars were wasted, the blame
lies not with Congress or the president but with state and local lawmakers and governors, who were provided with an additional $130 billion in federal aid with which they could maintain state and local spending or delay tax increases on local residents.
Since voters rarely object to tax reductions or transfer increases that
directly benefit themselves, I suspect many poll respondents believed—
erroneously—that most stimulus spending was used to pay for unpopular bank and automaker bailouts, wasteful public works projects, or
generously subsidized loans to politically connected businesses. The
fact that very little stimulus money was spent in this way was probably
known to only a small minority of voters.

GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT
Many Americans may be under the impression that the federal
government is still spending large amounts of money on what is popularly referred to as stimulus. Aside from very modest extra spending
on transfer payments, this is not the case. Spending on public investment—roads, bridges, school and college buildings, ports, medical labs,
and sewer systems—is done at the state and local level. The federal
government is primarily responsible for investment in defense. Figure
3.13 shows the trend in real spending on state and local government
investment in the two worst recessions of the postwar era. The solid
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Figure 3.13 State and Local Government Investment in Two
Postwar Recessions
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line shows the trend in real state and local spending on public investment during and after the recession of the early 1980s, and the dashed
line shows the same trend during and after the Great Recession. In the
recent recession, state spending on public investment projects held
up well when federal stimulus dollars were directly supporting state
budgets, but state and local investment began to shrink starting in the
seventh quarter after the onset of the recession. State and local investment spending has recently been one-fifth below its prerecession level.
In contrast, it shrank about 5 percent during the recession in the early
1980s but then began to recover. Six years after the start of the recession, state and local investment spending was one-third higher than it
was prior.
Statistics on total government outlays on final consumption and
investment are equally depressing. Figure 3.14 shows the trend in this
form of public spending at all levels of government—federal, state,
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Figure 3.14 Total Government Final Consumption and Gross Investment
in Two Postwar Recessions
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and local. This spending includes not only national defense and nondefense investment, but also the compensation payments to government
employees and contractors. The solid line in the chart shows the trend
in spending in the recession of the 1980s. Even though the national
government in that era was politically conservative, real spending rose
steadily and substantially during and after the economic downturn. In
the Great Recession, the stimulus packages initially pushed up government consumption and investment outlays, but by the tenth quarter after
the onset of the recession, spending already began to decline. By the
nineteenth quarter after the recession began, government consumption
and investment was 2 percent below its prerecession level. At the same
point in the recovery from the 1980s recession, real spending was 27
percent higher than it was before the recession began. During the Great
Recession, shrinking government budgets during the recovery tended
to depress overall demand; during the 1980s recession, steady increases
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in government spending throughout the recovery boosted aggregate
demand. Even though unemployment remained high and utilization of
the capital stock low, policymakers began to shrink public consumption
and investment soon after 2009. By 2013 real government spending on
these items was smaller than it was when the recession began.
Starting in 2010 advocates of government austerity may have
believed it was prudent to refrain from borrowing additional funds
because savers inside and outside the United States were growing frightened of the nation’s mounting public debt. Some stimulus critics feared
that current and future U.S. taxpayers would have to pay extraordinarily
high interest rates to borrow the funds needed to finance public budgets.
This fear seems nonsensical in view of the interest rates actually paid on
U.S. government debt. One indicator of the burden future taxpayers will
have to pay is the real interest rate savers demand in order to hold U.S.
Treasury securities. The world’s savers do not demand that the United
States pay much interest on its public debt. Figure 3.15 shows the trend
in real interest rates on five-year and long-duration indexed U.S. Treasury securities. For most of the 2011–2014 period, the five-year indexed
bond offered a yield of less than 0 percent. Savers offered to lend the
federal government funds for five years and receive interest payments
that did not even compensate them for the change in the price level. The
chart also displays the trend in real yields on long-duration inflationindexed Treasury securities.6 In the first four years after the financial
crisis the yield on these long-duration securities fell from 2.5 percent to
0.0 percent. In the last quarter of 2012 savers in effect offered to hold
federal debt without receiving any real compensation at all. Based on
the evidence in Figure 3.15, it is hard to see any evidence that savers
were losing confidence in the government’s ability to repay its debt.
If the government can find investment projects that are expected to
yield benefits that exceed 1 or 2 percent a year over the next 15–20 years,
it would be worthwhile to invest in those projects. Savers were offering
(and continue to offer) the federal government funds at historically low
interest rates at the same time the nation had millions of unemployed
workers and a sizable amount of unused productive capacity.
It is hard to believe the country cannot identify infrastructure
projects with payoffs that are expected to yield 1 or 2 percent a year.
According to the World Economic Forum’s most recent Global Competitiveness Report (Schwab 2013), infrastructure in the United States
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Figure 3.15 Real Yields on U.S. Treasury Inflation-Indexed Securities,
2003–2014
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ranks fifteenth among the countries graded. This is a somewhat higher
rank than Austria and a lower rank than Korea and Taiwan. Each of the
other countries has substantially lower average incomes than the United
States, so one might expect the United States to have substantially better infrastructure.
The fact that it does not suggests there are many attractive opportunities to improve or add to U.S. infrastructure. It is easy to identify types
of infrastructure that need improvement or repair. Every four years the
American Society of Civil Engineers offers a detailed assessment of
U.S. infrastructure, detailing its strengths and shortcomings across a
number of categories, including dams, drinking water systems, wastewater, bridges, inland waterways, and ports (see, for example, American Society of Civil Engineers [2013]). The report pinpoints areas
where current spending on maintenance falls short of the level needed
to keep the infrastructure operating at a constant level. For many kinds
of infrastructure, of course, a growing population and heavier demands
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require that we invest in new facilities. There was no better time for
such investment than the years immediately following the financial
crisis. The government’s borrowing cost for investment spending was
near a historical low, and the labor and capital resources needed to
produce additional investment were not being used by households and
private businesses. The failure to use fiscal policy, particularly public
investment policy, to bring the nation closer to full employment after
2009, represents the most notable failure of policymaking in the Great
Recession. It produced unnecessary suffering for the nation’s long-term
unemployed, and it wasted a rare opportunity to improve or rebuild the
nation’s public infrastructure at very low cost.

EXPLANATIONS
Policymakers failed to use fiscal policy adequately to deal with
the slump that followed the 2008 financial crisis. At least two factors
contributed to this failure. First, technical forecasts of the economic
fallout from the crisis understated its ultimate severity. Many analysts may have believed that when confidence in financial institutions
and financial markets was restored, the nonfinancial economy would
rebound quickly as normal credit flows resumed. For tens of millions
of households, however, a functioning financial system did not restore
their access to credit. For many, their primary asset was their home, and
that home was worth much less after 2007 than it was before. Fixing
the financial system did not repair the balance sheets of households
that borrowed heavily to purchase homes that lost a large share of their
value.
By the time forecasters and decision-makers recognized that consumer and business demand would not rebound quickly, the political
window for enacting an appropriately scaled fiscal program had closed.
Many voters accepted the verdict that the stimulus program had failed.
More to the point, they elected politicians to the House of Representatives committed to the idea that additional stimulus would put the creditworthiness of the United States at risk. Many politicians who were
most committed to addressing the nation’s unemployment problem
through fiscal policy lost in the 2010, 2012, and 2014 elections.
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Of course, the belief that a stimulus program is needed depends
crucially on the weight one assigns to the well-being of jobless workers
and the underemployed. If the distress of the unemployed ranks at the
top of voters’ concerns, policymakers may be willing to adopt strong
antirecession measures, even if the policies carry some risk or have
unpopular side effects such as a larger public debt. In many western
democracies voters care most intensely about the unemployed when
long-term unemployment is a plausible risk they face themselves. At
that point, job loss is not a risk facing some anonymous stranger. It is a
risk that represents a real possibility for themselves or a family member,
neighbor, or friend. The Great Recession was like other postwar recessions, both in the United States and in other rich democracies. Workers’ fear of losing their job spiked with the layoff rate and the number
of front-page stories about new mass layoffs. These stories fall off the
front page and out of the news cycle when the layoff rate declines, as
it inevitably does. The suffering of the unemployed slips from voters’
consciousness and seems less urgent to policymakers.
We saw this in Western Europe in the late 1980s, and I suspect our
great-grandparents also saw it in the late 1930s. In late-1980s Europe
and late-1930s America, the unemployment rate remained stubbornly
high, but layoffs were no longer an immediate concern of workers who
managed to hang on to their jobs or find new ones. The simple fact is
that a high level of long-term unemployment is not mainly the result of
a high current layoff rate but rather the result of the failure of private and
public employers to create enough new jobs to reemploy long-time job
seekers and to provide plentiful work opportunities for school leavers.
Even when the unemployment rate holds steady at 15 percent, it takes a
great deal of empathy on the part of voters who are safely employed to
place a high weight on the welfare of strangers who have been without
work for a long time. Workers’ altruism toward the unemployed gets
a lift when the layoff rate soars, but when this moment passes, as it
did after 2009, the welfare of the unemployed sinks lower among the
concerns of both voters and elected officials. After the moment passes,
it may be hard to persuade voters that further sacrifices for the unemployed are needed.
Although voters’ fears about the economic consequences of a larger
public debt were baseless, they may have been decisive in shifting the
priorities of policymakers toward fiscal austerity and away from further
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stimulus. That shift slowed the recovery and worsened the prospects of
the long-term unemployed as well as young adults trying to begin their
careers. While those two groups experienced unnecessary additional
pain as a result of the pivot toward austerity, it is hard to see how the
policy shift had a beneficial payoff for the voters whose election day
choices produced the policy shift.

Notes
1. http://www.nber.org/cycles.html (accessed October 29, 2014).
2. Atif, Rao, and Sufi (2013) offer a somewhat larger estimate of the expected loss
in consumption based on their finding that households with lower net worth and
higher leverage ratios cut spending more aggressively in response to a decline in
wealth.
3. http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/files/scf2013_tables_internal
_real.xls (accessed December 1, 2014).
4. Workers earning less than the average wage obtain compensation for a larger
fraction of their earnings loss, while those earning higher wages receive proportionately less generous compensation (Burtless and Gordon 2011; Immervoll and
Richardson 2013).
5. In February 2009 the White House published a comparison of the 2009 and 2010
projections of a number of forecasters. The administration predicted a year-overyear change in GDP of −1.2 percent; the CBO’s prediction was −0.9 percent; and
the consensus Blue Chip forecast was −1.6 percent. The actual change in real GDP
was −2.8 percent (the White House 2009).
6. This represents the average bid yields for all Treasury inflation-protected securities with remaining terms to maturity of 10 years or more.
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Central Banking
in the Great Recession
New Policies, Old Principles
Donald Kohn
Brookings Institution

In 2007 and 2008 the U.S. financial markets and economy were
hit with a series of huge shocks. As shown in Figure 4.1, house prices
started to fall in the summer of 2006 and eventually declined by an average of 35 percent. A superstructure of mortgage lending that had been
built on the expectation of ever-rising house prices began to unravel.
Mortgage loans had been made to increasingly unqualified borrowers and for speculative purposes, and it gradually became evident to
lenders—and more importantly, creditors of lenders—that these loans
would not be repaid and that the underlying collateral in many cases
would be worth less than what was owed on the loans, leaving lenders
to incur losses. Complicating the picture greatly was the fact that these
loans had been bundled into securities and then sliced and diced and
resold so that no one could be sure where the losses would fall. In the
resulting financial panic and recession, equity prices fell by almost half,
and the unemployment rate rose from 4.75 percent to over 10 percent
(see Figures 4.2 and 4.3).
Ben Bernanke, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, and other
observers have noted that the initial shock, including the doubts about
the viability of financial institutions, was larger than that which started
the Great Depression. Many economists, including Bernanke, have
attributed the extent and duration of the Great Depression importantly
to the failure of the Federal Reserve to counter the emerging problems
aggressively enough. This chapter focuses on what the Federal Reserve
did in the Great Recession of 2007–2009 to avoid a repeat. To this
end, it undertook a series of unconventional and largely unprecedented
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Figure 4.1 House Prices, 2007–2011
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Figure 4.2 Equity Prices, 2007–2009
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Figure 4.3 Unemployment Rate, 2007–2011
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policy actions. But my hypothesis is that these actions did not come
from nowhere; rather, they were natural extensions of policies utilized
in more normal times, founded on past central bank behavior and lessons learned from previous experience in tough times, here and in other
countries. I was the vice chairman of the Federal Reserve Board from
2006 to 2010, and this account is based in part on my first-hand experience contributing to the formulation and implementation of many of
these unconventional policies.

POLICYMAKING IN A CRISIS
From several perspectives, managing a crisis is extraordinarily challenging. Although the Fed could and did take some broad lessons from
history, the few precedents for the situation in the United States were
either very old or occurred in financial systems that were much differ-
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ent (the Depression) or much milder (the financial shocks of the 1980s
and 1990s). In addition, the policymakers did not know the true state
of the world. Market participants and the Federal Reserve were working with stale information about lenders and borrowers from outdated
balance sheets and income statements. The supervisors at the Fed could
supply more up to date analysis and information, but the situation was
evolving rapidly, important institutions under fire were not banks and
hadn’t been subject to close oversight, and people in the private sector
supplying new information often had vested interests in pushing the
Fed toward one policy choice or another. We could observe what was
going on in markets, but market prices were driven by fear and panic
and did not represent underlying values that were likely to prevail over
time. The lack of precedent and knowledge of the true state of the world
meant that the Fed was operating largely under Knightian uncertainty—
a circumstance in which it could not make good estimates of the probabilities of particular outcomes.
We had one critical advantage: Ben Bernanke’s leadership. One
aspect of that good fortune was his leadership style. He remained calm
under severe stress, providing an anchor for the rest of us. And he was
open to new ideas—sending out “blue sky” emails with lots of suggestions on new approaches and soliciting the views of others.
In addition, Bernanke is a leading scholar of the Great Depression, and he was well aware of the ways that financial crises propagate
through the economic system. He was also aware of the mistakes the
Federal Reserve had made that allowed that propagation to occur in
the 1930s, resulting in an economic crisis of unprecedented length and
severity. In a 90th birthday celebration for Milton Friedman well before
the most recent crisis, Bernanke noted that, thanks to Friedman and his
coauthor, economist Anna Schwartz, we now understood what we—the
Fed—had done wrong in the Depression, we were very sorry, and we
promised we wouldn’t let it happen again. The story of 2007–2009 is
what the Fed under Bernanke’s leadership did to make good on that
promise.
The Federal Reserve devised many unconventional and innovative policies to counter the effects of the crisis, but they were based
on extensions of tried and true central bank policy tools. Those tools
fell into two broad categories—lending by the Fed through its discount
window and lowering interest rates in the conduct of monetary policy.
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The two policies are not entirely separable: for example, lending at the
discount window increased the Fed’s balance sheet and led to lower
interest rates, and the more successful one type of policy was the less
pressure on the other. But they did have different origins, and this chapter covers each type separately.

LENDING
Large segments of the financial sector are inherently fragile, reflecting what we expect from it. When we give it our savings we often want
to be able to get them back quickly and with the principle intact—we
want high liquidity. However, when we borrow we do so at longer
terms, say, for 3–4 years to finance the purchase of a car and 30 years to
buy a house, or, for a business, for several months to finance inventory
or several years to finance capital equipment and buildings. So, banks
and many other financial intermediaries operate with marked maturity
mismatches: their liabilities—our savings—are far shorter than their
assets—our borrowing. They also tend to rely very heavily on deposits
or other borrowing and very little on equity, which is a more expensive
source of funds, so they are highly leveraged with small cushions of
equity to absorb losses on their loans and other assets. This fragile structure rests on confidence—confidence that whenever we want to access
our savings—for example, to get cash from our deposit or money fund
investment—we will be able to do so and get the full amount we are
expecting.
When people lose confidence in the financial sector, bad things happen. They recognize that they are more likely to be able to get their
funds in full and on time if they are near the head of the line; after others have withdrawn, the institution may run out of cash or assets that
can readily be turned into cash. When confidence is lost, we get runs on
banks or other financial intermediaries. If enough people try to get their
money back, institutions will be forced to sell often illiquid assets—and
sell them at any price to meet demands for cash. That results in fire sales
of assets that can drive the price of the assets well below their intrinsic
value.
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In 2007 and 2008 the panic originated from developments in the
subprime mortgage market, but that triggered much wider duress. As
house prices declined, people began to realize that many lenders faced
large losses. However, the mortgages had been packaged together and
those packages had been broken up and repackaged in complex and
opaque ways. Consequently, no one could be sure where the losses
would eventually be absorbed, and there was a more general pulling
back from lending to a variety of financial institutions. The financial
institutions under stress needed to sell assets, driving down the price of
mortgages and other assets even further, raising more questions about
the viability of lenders and provoking further withdrawals. A Wall
Street/financial institution death spiral was under way.
Critically, when lenders are under pressure they pull back from
making new loans. Credit for households and businesses tightens up,
or in the extreme dries up entirely. When we can’t borrow to buy goods
and services we cut back spending, which causes businesses to lay off
workers, who in turn may have to default on loans and reduce spending
further, deepening the recession and financial sector stress. The Wall
Street death spiral becomes a Main Street death spiral.
The central bank’s tools to deal with a Main Street death spiral are
limited. The Fed can’t step in and lend directly to households and businesses—it is not equipped to make those types of decisions, and we
wouldn’t want an institution that is both public sector and politically
independent closely involved in allocating credit by picking and choosing among loan applicants. What it can do is intervene in the financial
sector, reducing the pressure on banks and other institutions to end the
runs and fire sales and keep credit flowing to Main Street.
The person who first recognized and formulated the policy for the
central bank in a panic was Walter Bagehot, and he did so in the middle
of the nineteenth century, after watching the Bank of England deal with
financial panics in the City of London. He said the central bank should
lend to banks and other institutions freely so they can meet deposit
withdrawals and pay back lenders. Central banks should lend against
illiquid but still good collateral, giving the banks a source of funds they
could access without engaging in fires sales of assets. By being ready to
make liquidity available to banks and other institutions, central banks
would assure depositors and other lenders that they could get their
funds back when they asked for them, so they didn’t need to line up to
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withdraw, forestalling or at least limiting panics. In effect, the central
bank would provide liquidity insurance to banks and sometimes other
intermediaries; special government intervention was justified by the
key role financial institutions play in the broader economy, intermediating between savers and spenders and operating the payments system.
Indeed, the Fed was founded in 1913 in large part because the absence
of a lender of last resort had made financial panics in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries more destructive than they would have
been if a lender had been ready to step in.
But lending freely against good collateral was not the end of Bagehot’s advice or of the central bank playbook based on his recommendations. Any insurance carries moral hazard—it reduces the incentives
for the buyers of the insurance to take steps to protect themselves. Two
other elements in the central bank playbook for lending into a panic are
designed to limit that moral hazard. First, lend only to solvent institutions; do not keep alive institutions that have made so many fundamentally bad decisions they have run through their shareholder capital. And
second, charge a penalty rate relative to the rates that will prevail once
market functioning is restored; higher rates mean that the central bank
will be the lender of last resort—after private sector funds dry up—and
will induce borrowers from the central bank to repay when markets
normalize.
The Federal Reserve implemented the Bagehot-based rule book. As
Figure 4.4 shows, it lent in great size during the crisis—especially after
generalized market panic that followed the failure of Lehman Brothers.
Total discount window lending, which is normally close to zero, shot
up to nearly $1.8 trillion in early 2009. But it also lent at a penalty to
market rates, so as markets stabilized and financial institutions were
recapitalized by the government and in the markets, lending subsided
fairly rapidly over 2009.
Although lending mostly followed the Bagehot principles, the
Fed found it had to innovate in several ways to achieve its objectives
of stemming the panic and promoting greater availability of credit to
households and businesses. Banks are the usual counterparties of the
Federal Reserve at the discount window, but banks became reluctant to
use the window because they feared looking weak, which might feed a
run instead of stopping it. This stigma got in the way of the Fed’s ability
to supply liquidity and avert credit tightening when uncertainty about
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Figure 4.4 Lending by the Federal Reserve
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counterparty risk disrupted interbank funding markets. It then began to
make the credit to banks available in auctions in which many participated so no one stood out.
A critical characteristic of the events of 2008 was that the panic
wasn’t limited to the banking system. Figure 4.5 shows intermediation involving securitization of loans and money market lending outside banks themselves—dubbed the shadow banking system—rose
substantially before the crisis. The securitization of mortgages meant
that they were spread throughout the financial system and often not
held in banks. In many respects, that was fine because risk was widely
dispersed, often among long-term holders. But a lot of the pieces of
securitized mortgages were held in financial structures that looked
and behaved like banks in that the long-term mortgages were financed
by short-term debt and backed by little if any equity to absorb losses.
Some of those structures were attached in one way or another to banks
and came back to them as confidence evaporated. But vulnerabilities
extended well beyond the banking system, and runs spread to brokerdealers holding mortgage securities, money market funds lending to the
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Figure 4.5 Shadow Banking Liabilities, 2000–2014
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broker-dealers, and other elements in this so-called shadow banking
system. The United States is generally fortunate to have well-developed
securities and securitization markets alongside its banks; they can keep
the credit flowing when the banks are in trouble and not lending. But
in 2008 all elements of the system were subject to runs and fire sales
as confidence evaporated; the problems in the nonbanks were having
serious adverse effects on the abilities of households and businesses to
borrow. In response, the Federal Reserve activated an authorization to
lend to nonbanks that it hadn’t used since the 1930s. It lent to brokerdealers, to money market funds, to issuers of commercial paper, and to
buyers of securitized debt to limit the damage to the economy from the
panic afflicting financial markets.
It wasn’t only problems at U.S. banks and markets that were damaging the U.S. economy; many foreign banks also were in trouble in
their transactions in dollars, and that was feeding back badly on U.S.
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financial markets. In the years leading up to the crisis many foreign
banks, attracted by the high rates and the high ratings from the credit
rating agencies, invested in pieces of subprime mortgage securitizations. These banks were funding those investments with short-term
borrowings and deposits, often not in dollars but instead with domestic
deposits the banks subsequently converted into dollars in short-term
markets, like swap markets. As confidence in the banks waned, they lost
access to swap markets, and they needed to bid more strongly directly
in U.S. markets for dollars; this was putting upward pressure on U.S.
interest rates at a time when the Fed was trying to hold those rates down
to fight recession.
The Fed could and did lend directly to foreign banks operating in
the United States at its discount window, but in many cases it didn’t
have the information to judge whether the borrowing bank was solvent or whether the collateral it had to offer was sound. So, the Federal
Reserve lent dollars to foreign central banks to lend to their domestic
banks, allowing the foreign central banks to make those difficult judgment calls. That lending between central banks was called “central bank
foreign currency liquidity swaps,” and the loans were unprecedented in
the size and the purpose for which they were made.
I have already noted the high degree of uncertainty that faced the
central bank in coping with the crisis. Of course, the private sector was
dealing with the same phenomenon. In particular, lenders to financial
institutions and other borrowers were concerned that they couldn’t
judge the depth of the likely losses in their counterparties, which could
prove considerable in a period of unprecedented declines in asset
prices. Lenders might be willing to take some risk, but the potential for
very large losses impeded their willingness to extend funding. So, the
Fed, for several of its facilities (sometimes together with the Treasury’s
TARP facility) took on this tail risk—it would absorb extremely large
losses once the private sector had taken some losses. Although the Fed
didn’t take any losses of this sort, its willingness to do so helped bolster
private lender confidence and restore the more normal working of the
markets.
Did these lending facilities work? Yes, eventually. They didn’t prevent a panic, especially after the failure of Lehman Brothers, but they
did limit the extent of the damage to the markets and the economy and,
by boosting confidence, helped to restore more normal functioning of
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the markets. They didn’t prevent panic in part because the law requires
that to activate lending to nonbanks, the Federal Reserve Board must
find that a deeply problematic situation already prevails—the circumstances are “unusual and exigent” and credit is not otherwise available. By necessity, these nonbank facilities had to be put into place in
response to panicky situations that had already developed.
Were they “bailouts”? The funds were advanced when private
credit was not available, and without the Fed’s lending, many more
institutions would have gone under. But they were loans, not capital
injections, for the most part to solvent institutions that were denied
access to markets because of developments beyond their control, fully
in keeping with the Bagehot principles and the intent of the writers of
the Federal Reserve Act.
However, there were also borderline situations when the liquidity
needs of troubled institutions were met through special facilities. These
were uncomfortable for the Fed, but the authorities, including the Treasury as well as the Fed, judged that the failure of the particular institution would have had major adverse consequences for the economy, and
alternative methods for dealing with the situation were not available.
Now they are. The Fed strongly backed a part of Dodd-Frank that gave
the FDIC, working with the Fed and other authorities, new powers to
resolve troubled financial institutions without endangering the stability
of the financial system. Loans to individual troubled institutions are not
permitted after Dodd-Frank, but the alternative should be effective in
protecting stability while allowing institutions to fail in an orderly way.

MONETARY POLICY AND INTEREST RATES
The second main strand of Federal Reserve policy in the crisis
involved the setting of interest rates—monetary policy. Through its
announcements and open market operations to add and subtract reserves
from the banking system, the Fed exerts very close control over an
overnight interest rate—the federal funds rate. As Figure 4.6 shows, in
a recession, the Fed normally reduces this rate to fight unemployment
and keep inflation from falling much below its target. Lowering the
federal funds rate—or market expectations that it will be lowered—
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Figure 4.6 Federal Funds Rate, 1973–2013
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generally leads to decreased intermediate and long-term interest rates.
Lower intermediate and longer-term rates make it cheaper for people
to borrow to buy cars and houses, and for businesses to finance new
capital equipment and buildings. They also tend to raise asset prices,
which is especially important for equities and houses because that’s
what constitutes household wealth, and when people are wealthier they
tend to spend a little more because they don’t need to save as much for
the future. Lower interest rates also tend to depreciate the dollar on foreign exchange markets as investments in foreign assets look to return
more relative to investments here in the United States; a lower dollar
makes our exports more affordable to foreigners and makes their products less affordable for U.S. residents, shifting spending to the output
of U.S. factories.
Lower interest rates, higher wealth, and a cheaper dollar all tend
to boost spending. Greater spending puts people back to work, and the
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extra demand keeps inflation from falling below the Fed’s target or
causes inflation to rise once it is already below target. In the fall and
winter of 2008–2009, the United States was in a deep recession, but the
federal funds rate was already at zero. Fortunately, several economists,
including Ben Bernanke, had thought about what to do in this situation,
which Japan had been facing for some time. The advice was to intervene in the financial markets further along the chain—reduce intermediate and long-term rates directly, which in turn should stimulate spending through all the channels mentioned above—cost of credit, wealth,
and exchange rates. It would also bolster confidence and encourage risk
taking at a time when lenders were extremely risk averse. Two separate techniques were used to reduce intermediate- and long-term interest rates: buying longer-term debt and giving more information about
policy intentions to lower expectations about the path of interest rates
in the future.
The Fed called the first technique large-scale asset purchases, but
everyone else called it quantitative easing. The assets purchased were
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) guaranteed by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, securities issued by these two agencies, and U.S. Treasury
bonds. The Fed started by announcing definite amounts—e.g., $1.25
trillion—but, after several iterations with specific amounts, finished
with an open-ended commitment to buy long-term Treasuries and MBS
at a pace of $85 billion per month until the economy had improved
enough that this extraordinary action was no longer needed. In fact,
purchases continued at this pace from the fall of 2012 until December
2013, after which the pace of purchases was phased down gradually
(tapered) until October 2014, when they stopped altogether. As Figure
4.7 shows, the securities portfolio of the Fed had reached nearly $4.5
trillion by that time, up from under $1 trillion before the crisis.
How was this supposed to work? The purchases had several effects
on markets. By increasing the demand for the long-term securities that
were being purchased, they raised the price and lowered the yield.
Lower yields on Treasuries and MBS caused investors to look around
for other, higher-yielding, assets, such as equities and corporate bonds;
and the investors who sold the Treasury bonds and MBS now had cash
to redeploy to other long-term assets. In these ways, the Fed’s purchases
in particular segments of the securities markets were transmitted to
financial markets more broadly. In addition, the announcement of the

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be
set to Always in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your
Customer Service Representative if you have questions about fnding this option.

Job Name:

--

/402798t

80 Kohn
Figure 4.7 Federal Reserve Securities Portfolio, 2002–2014
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purchases likely signaled the Federal Reserve’s determination to use
unconventional policies to promote a return to full employment and get
inflation up to its 2 percent target, reinforcing its messages that interest
rates would be low for a long time.
The second technique to lower intermediate and longer-term rates
was to make that message about the expected path for the federal funds
rate in the future much more explicit than usual—that is, give forward
guidance on interest rates. The Fed used a variety of formulations of
its language about the path of rates to convince markets that the rate
would remain essentially at zero for quite some time—longer than market participants might otherwise have anticipated. The expected path
for short-term rates is a key component in determining long-term rates,
and the Fed’s intention through its assurances about holding rates low
for long was to lower longer-term rates—or to keep them from rising
before the Fed thought it consistent with achieving its employment and
inflation objectives.
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Like asset purchases, the specific form of the guidance evolved
over time. What began as very vague guidance—“for some time” and
“for a considerable period”—shifted to more precise time-based guidance—“at least through mid-2013” and then “at least through 2014.”
The language became more focused on economic conditions—“at least
until unemployment falls below 6.5 percent, provided inflation does
not exceed the 2 percent target by more than one-half percent”—and
then moved to a combination of economic conditions keyed to progress
towards its objectives and time—it would be “patient” in raising rates.
In 2014, it dropped the “patient” language and focused only on actual
and expected progress toward its inflation and employment goals.
The Fed needed to return to these monetary policy tools multiple
times over an extended period because the recovery from the very deep
recession was so slow and disappointing. The Fed’s legislation gives it
two mandates: “maximum employment and stable prices.” Maximum
employment is interpreted as the highest level that can be sustained
over time without promoting ever increasing inflation. That goal is usually expressed in terms of the unemployment rate—how low can it go
without creating inflation problems. In 2014, the central tendency of
the participants at Federal Open Market Committee meetings is that the
unemployment rate could go to 5 to 5.25 percent on a sustained basis
without untoward inflation developments, and that level was broadly in
alignment with the estimates of many outside economists at that time.
But as shown in Figure 4.8, the unemployment rate did not come down
to that level until early 2015.
For stable prices the Fed has set a target of 2 percent inflation measured by the PCE deflator. That goal is plotted in Figure 4.9, along with
realized inflation. The 2 percent goal is shared by many central banks
around the world. It’s not zero because that would risk falling into a
costly deflationary spiral too often. And, inflation below 2 percent on
average would mean interest rates would be very low on average, giving the Fed little room to ease its fed funds target if bad things happened
to the economy.
Until 2015, the economy operated with a far weaker labor market
than consistent with “maximum employment”; moreover, in the period
after the crisis inflation ran consistently below the 2 percent target. The
Fed anticipated that the recovery from the very deep recession would
be slower than most recoveries from deep recessions. We entered the
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Figure 4.8 Unemployment Relative to Full Employment, 2007–2015
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recession with an overhang of houses on the market, with households
having incurred unsustainable levels of debt, and with lenders having
deeply impaired balance sheets as households and businesses defaulted
on debts in the housing downturn and recession. Rebuilding balance
sheets takes time and elevated saving. But the economic expansion
has been disappointing even relative to these restrained expectations,
and inflation has persisted below target; as actual economic activity
and prices fell short, the Federal Reserve judged that it needed these
repeated rounds of policy easing to hit its legislated goals.
Given that disappointment, did the policy easing work? The studies of the Fed’s announcements on financial conditions generally have
shown that the actions were effective in lowering interest rates and raising asset prices. The effects might have been greatest in the Treasury
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Figure 4.9 Inflation Relative to Federal Reserve Target, 2007–2015
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and MBS markets, where the purchases were made, but they seem to
have fed through to some extent into other markets where households
and businesses borrow and invest. What is much harder to show, not
surprisingly considering the lackluster recovery, is that the lower interest rates and higher equity prices had a substantially positive effect on
spending. Models drawing on historical relationships say they did, and
so does the logic in this chapter. Some of the “headwinds” the economy
faced were not anticipated—for example, eurozone problems beginning in 2010, restrictive U.S. fiscal policy in 2012 and 2013, and very
tight credit conditions continuing for longer than expected in residential
real estate markets. I believe that the recovery and expansion would
have been even weaker than we experienced if the Fed had not been so
aggressive.
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CONCLUSION
Ben Bernanke said during the crisis that he didn’t agree with some
of what Franklin Roosevelt did to get out of the Depression, but he
admired Roosevelt’s determination to try new things until something
worked. That was one lesson underlined by the Fed’s response to the
crisis: in unprecedented circumstances, innovate until you find something effective. At the same time, those innovations need to be based on
deep thinking about the nature of the problems and the tools at hand to
deal with them. The Fed couldn’t inject capital into the financial system—that was for TARP—but it could supply liquidity very broadly,
and it could ease financial conditions through a variety of techniques to
lower interest rates in order to stimulate spending.
Among the most difficult aspects of crisis management was explaining to Congress and the public what the Fed did and why. Bernanke
tried to explain the link between the Fed’s actions and Main Street, for
example, through two interviews on the TV show 60 Minutes, but the
unprecedented nature of the actions compounded the problem of explanation; lending is why the Fed was founded, but it hadn’t engaged in
that sort or scale of crisis management in many decades. There was no
precedent for the assets purchases it engaged in, allowing the imaginations of some observers to conjure up all kinds of adverse consequences
that, to date, have not materialized. And transparency about some of
the actions—for example, who took its loans—could run counter to the
efficacy of the policy. Public misunderstanding was widespread and
echoed (and amplified) in the Congress. The Federal Reserve was perceived to be bailing out large banks and Wall Street more generally,
sometimes perceived to be at the expense of Main Street. On monetary
policy, it was arguing the counterfactual—it would have been worse
without its actions.
Despite the difficulties of explication and understanding, evidence
and analysis strongly support the conclusion that the Federal Reserve’s
actions limited the damage to jobs and income from plunging real estate
prices and expedited the return to the agency’s objective of “maximum
employment and stable prices.”
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At present and going forward, activist fiscal policy is likely to be
essential for the U.S. economy to operate near potential levels of output
and employment. This view is a substantial departure from the nearconsensus of economists that monetary policy alone could and should
be left to carry out the stabilization policy mission, a belief that prevailed for nearly a generation prior to the 2008 financial crisis.
As of 2007, the “Great Moderation” in the United States had lasted
for 20 years (see Stock and Watson [2003]). Since 1984, fluctuations
in output and unemployment had been modest and seemed to even out
over time, and confidence grew that the business cycle had been largely
tamed. Much of the credit for this experience went to monetary policy,
which had learned how to coarsely tune if not fine-tune the economy.
In 1997, it was Paul Krugman who said, “the unemployment rate will
be what Alan Greenspan wants it to be, plus or minus a random error
reflecting the fact that he is not quite God” (Krugman 1997). The Federal Reserve appeared to have the tools to successfully manage aggregate demand to achieve the maximum levels of employment and production consistent with rough price stability.
Ten years ago, most economists likewise agreed that fiscal policy
should not be a tool for smoothing the business cycle. Instead, the focus
of good fiscal policy was the right-sizing of government spending and
the control of budget deficits. Preventing excessive deficits was essential to maintaining confidence and avoiding unduly high interest rates
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that would slow economic growth. Adding an unnecessary stabilization
policy mission to fiscal policy, so the near-consensus went, could only
create distraction and confusion to no benefit.
But in 2008 the Great Moderation came to an abrupt close, as the
financial crisis that began a year earlier ushered in the Great Recession.
On December 5, 2008, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds
rate below 20 basis points (0.2 percent), using up all its conventional
monetary policy ammunition. Since then, the Fed has sought to boost
aggregate demand through the unconventional policies of forward
guidance and quantitative easing. Yet despite this monetary stimulus,
the recovery that technically began in the second half of 2009 has been
dismal in regard to moving output and employment toward their pre2008 trends, and also in comparison with previous recoveries from deep
recessions.
In some ways, the end of the Great Moderation and the onset of
the Great Recession have had remarkably little impact on public policy
debates. The most discussed economic issue in Washington over the last
four years has been the need for strong action to achieve fiscal consolidation, not the urgency to restore full employment. Even though inflation and employment are both well below target, the vast majority of
criticism directed at the Fed has been that its policy is too lax.
One change in public discourse, however, has been a shift from the
optimism of the Great Moderation to a growing belief that the damage
to the labor force and economy from the Great Recession is permanent,
and that we are settling into a “new normal” in which employment levels easily reached before 2008 are now unattainable.
Although the new economic conditions of the post–Great Moderation era do require substantially new economic thinking, they do not
warrant an attitude of resignation about a semi-stagnant new normal.
Ironically, the appropriate new thinking is largely old thinking: traditional Keynesian ideas of the 1930s–1960s that were largely downplayed in the wake of the stagflation of the 1970s and the accompanying
“New Classical” revolution in macroeconomic theory. Three concepts
comprise the most important of these ideas: 1) Keynes’s view that the
liquidity trap, or zero bound on short-term nominal interest rates, can
sharply limit the efficacy of monetary stabilization policy; 2) President
John F. Kennedy’s “Economics 101” view of the desirability of fiscal
stimulus during a slump; and 3) the possibility that a prolonged epi-
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sode of weak demand and high unemployment in an economy may have
destructive consequences for aggregate supply (Blanchard and Summers 1986; Okun 1973).
After outlining these ideas, we discuss policy implications. In an
economy with a depressed labor market and monetary policy constrained
by the zero bound, there is a strong case for a fiscal expansion to boost
aggregate demand. The benefits from such a policy greatly exceed traditional estimates of fiscal multipliers, both because increases in demand
raise expected inflation, which reduces real interest rates, and because
pushing the economy toward full employment will have long-lasting
positive effects on the labor force and productivity.
We argue that in a liquidity trap environment like the one we are
experiencing at present, properly designed fiscal stimulus is likely to
reduce rather than increase the long-run debt burden.1 This outcome
reflects a combination of the direct benefits of stimulus in raising revenues; the favorable impact of increased gross domestic product in
reducing the debt/GDP ratio; the possibility that fiscal stimulus today
reduces future spending burdens, such as the cost of deferred maintenance; favorable supply impacts of public investments; and possible reductions in real interest rate costs that come from increases in
expected inflation.
We also present new evidence derived from recent research at the
Federal Reserve. Reifschneider, Wascher, and Wilcox (2013) introduce
hysteresis on the supply side into the Federal Reserve’s principal macroeconomic model. Hysteresis refers to a situation in which cyclical
economic downturns diminish the economy’s ability to produce output
in the future. The finding from this exercise is that a sustained increase
in government purchases can reduce the long-run debt/GDP ratio, even
in the absence of direct supply-side benefits from government purchases, and even in the absence of any impact of current purchases on
future needs for government spending.

THE DOWNTURN AND THE DISAPPOINTING RECOVERY
Figure 5.1, from Reifschneider, Wascher, and Wilcox (2013), traces
the behavior of real GDP (the bottom line) relative to the supply-side
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Figure 5.1 Federal Reserve Estimates of Potential Output
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growth trend that the economy appeared to be following before 2008,
as estimated by the authors’ state-space model from pre–financial crisis
data (the top line). In 2013 GDP was approximately 10 percent below
its previous trend, with output growing too slowly to close this gap.
(The middle line in the graph is the Fed’s statistical estimate of how
much of the output loss is permanent, a major focus of what follows.)
Similarly, it appears that only very limited progress has been made
in returning employment to normal levels. While unemployment has
declined substantially, from its peak of 10.0 percent in October 2009
to 6.7 percent in February 2014, this 3.3 percentage point decline is
mostly a reflection of labor force withdrawal rather than successful job
finding. The fall in the official unemployment rate has not been accompanied by the 1.0 percentage point rise in labor force participation that
one would expect based on past recoveries, but rather by a further 2.0
point decline. Thus, arithmetically, only 0.3 points of the decline in the
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unemployment rate are due to increases in the employment-to-population ratio, and 3.0 points are due to dropouts from the labor force.2
The employment-to-population ratio peaked at 63.4 percent in
December 2006, fell sharply to 58.5 percent in October 2009, and since
then has flatlined, standing today at 58.8 percent. Of particular concern
are the persistently high rates of long-term unemployment, defined as
the share of the labor force looking for work for at least six months.
Since 1975, the average long-term jobless rate has been about 1.0 percent, but over the last downturn it peaked at a historically unprecedented
level of 4.4 percent, and it remains highly elevated at over 2.0 percent.
This erosion of labor force participation and of estimates of potential output since 2007 has no obvious cause related to factor supply or
technology. Indeed, it has come as a surprise to nearly all forecasters.
The Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) forecasts of potential output
as of 2008 included no future growth slowdown. In January 2010, CBO
projected an average unemployment rate for 2013 of 6.2 percent; the
actual rate was 7.3 percent. CBO projected a labor force participation
rate of 65.1 percent for 2014; actual labor force participation in February 2014 was 63.0 percent.
If we look at history, we can see why economists expected a strong
recovery from the Great Recession, and we can see why it did not happen. The worst post–World War II recession before that of 2008–2009
was the recession of 1981–1982. The unemployment rate peaked at 10.8
percent at the end of 1982 but then fell rapidly to 7.2 percent with rising
labor force participation over the following year and a half. Unemployment was pushed down rapidly by output growth rates of 7–8 percent.
With that experience as background, it was not unnatural to anticipate
as of late 2009 a similar recovery from the spike in unemployment.
This expectation, however, neglected to consider the reasons for
the 1980s recovery. As documented by Romer and Romer (1994), rapid
growth after 1982 was fueled by the countercyclical policy of the Federal Reserve. With short-term nominal interest rates at 15 percent when
the 1980s downturn began, the Fed had ample room to reduce interest
rates sharply and continue to reduce them until a strong recovery took
hold. The Fed also reduced interest rates in 2008, but the loosening
cycle began with the federal funds rate at 5 percent, and by the end of
that year the funds rate had already hit its lower bound of zero—just as
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economists such as Rudebusch (2009) were estimating that, according
to standard interest rate rules, the economy needed rates of −4 or −5
percent for a strong recovery. Such a degree of monetary ease was obviously impossible: nobody would lend money at a significantly negative
nominal interest rate rather than hold currency.
The idea that interest rates can get stuck above the level needed for
full employment, constraining the effectiveness of monetary policy, is
the liquidity trap that Keynes (1936) emphasized in his General Theory.
Through most of the decades since Keynes wrote, the liquidity trap was
considered a theoretical oddity of little practical importance—a concept useful primarily for designing trick questions on college economics exams. But U.S. short-term nominal interest rates on safe assets like
government securities have been stuck at zero for more than five years.
Japanese short-term safe rates have been below 1 percent for 20 years.
An escape from the liquidity trap is not imminent. The median FOMC
participant is now anticipating that as of December 2015 the federal
funds rate will still be only 75 basis points (0.75 percent). And at every
stage since 2007, the median FOMC participant has overestimated
the future strength of the economy, the level of inflation, and the level
of interest rates. The futures market is more pessimistic, predicting a
December 2015 federal funds rate of 60 basis points.
The Fed certainly still has some expansionary policy options. Even
when the federal funds rate is constrained by the zero bound, the Fed
can still lower longer-term interest rates by providing forward guidance as to the future path of the short-term rate, and via “quantitative
easing.” However, as even strong proponents recognize, quantitative
easing policies raise issues of sustainability, market distortion, efficacy,
and exit management. Moreover, the experience of both the United
States and the United Kingdom over the last year raises doubts about
the credibility of long-term forward guidance.
As DeLong and Summers (2012) explain at length, the liquidity
trap magnifies the impact of fiscal policy on economic activity and
employment. During a liquidity trap, interest rates will not increase
when a fiscal expansion raises the level of demand, thereby avoiding
the crowding-out effects that normally arise from fiscal policies. Moreover, with a fixed nominal interest rate, if increases in demand raise the
rate of inflation, real interest rates fall and investment is stimulated.
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This last point deserves emphasis. In normal times, the Federal
Reserve has a preferred level of economic activity given its views on
output and employment; it therefore can be expected to offset any fiscal
impacts on growth. This was the logic behind the Clinton 1993 budget
program. Reducing prospective deficits was expected to and in fact did
lead to a reduction in interest rates, which in turn crowded in investment, stimulating growth.
Under current circumstances, though, fiscal stimulus crowds
in investment to the extent that it succeeds in raising future demand
and therefore profit levels, and to the extent that it succeeds in raising
expected future inflation and thus reduces real interest rates.

THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF CYCLICAL SLUMPS
Evidence from Historical Comparisons and Labor Market Studies
The lessons of economic history suggest that the tepid quality of the
current U.S. recovery should not be too surprising. For ease of presentation, economics textbooks typically portray recessions as temporary
events, as part of a “cycle” that is independent of and does not affect the
longer-run “trend,” and after a recession, losses in output and employment are reversed within a few years. But empirical support for this
view comes primarily from the United States between 1873 and 1970
and is complicated by the fact that the Great Depression of the 1930s
was followed by the countervailing extraordinary war mobilization of
World War II. The textbook model of short-term recessions is contradicted by research based on broader international data. International
Monetary Fund (IMF) studies, such as the 2009 World Economic Outlook (IMF 2009) that look at post–World War II financial crises, find
that essentially all of the output decline associated with a typical crisis
persists for at least seven years, and little or none of the shortfall relative to the precrisis trend is recovered within that time span. Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009) and others have also documented that the output
losses following financial crises are persistent indeed. The ugly technical term for these highly persistent effects is hysteresis.

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be
set to Always in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your
Customer Service Representative if you have questions about fnding this option.

Job Name:

--

/402798t

92 Ball, DeLong, and Summers

Earlier work such as Blanchard and Summers (1986) as well as Ball
(1999) focused on the effects of deep recessions on the natural rate of
unemployment. The empirical record showed that increases in unemployment often were highly persistent. In many European countries,
the recessions in the 1980s and 1990s caused rises in unemployment
that were never reversed, and unemployment ratcheted up again as the
2008 crisis spread around the world. There appeared to be a correlation between persistent unemployment-rate increases after a downturn
and an absence of a strong stimulative monetary response to recession.
Although the zero bound on interest rates was rarely binding, monetary
policy was constrained by other factors. Often the key factor was either
Europe’s current common currency or the system of fixed exchange
rates that preceded it. Sometimes countercyclical monetary policy was
precluded by anti-inflationary zeal on the part of policymakers, notably
Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom. The absence of sufficient
monetary stimulus is a feature that these episodes have in common
with the recent U.S. experience, as the appropriate monetary policy
response, at least in the interest-rate-rule calculations of Rudebusch,
was mathematically impossible.
The historical evidence for hysteresis is complemented by lines of
research in labor economics by Davis and von Wachter (2011); Ghyrad
(2013); Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2012); and many others. This work documents substantial deleterious effects of deep economic slumps on individual workers who lose jobs—in other words,
the microeconomic problems that underlie persistent unemployment.
Lost jobs disrupt careers because workers become less and less likely to
find new jobs as the length of their unemployment spells increases. An
experiment by Ghyrad, in which resumes were sent to employers that
advertised jobs, finds that workers with more than six months of unemployment experienced very low employer response rates—lower than
those for workers who had less relevant experience but did not possess
the stigma of a long unemployment spell.
Even when an unemployed worker finds a job, it is typically lower
paying than the worker’s previous job. It is striking that this adverse
effect on earnings is still apparent decades later.
It is even more striking, as Davis and von Wachter (2011) find, that
these effects are particularly large when a worker loses a job during a
recession. A rational-signaling model in which a long unemployment
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spell reveals that a worker is potentially of a low-productivity type
would imply that those who lose their jobs due to an aggregate shock
like a financial crisis are more likely than other unemployed workers to
reattain employment.
As Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2012) find, a recession
also damages the long-term prospects of young workers entering the
labor force. Those who graduate from college during a recession have
worse labor market prospects. Once again, the adverse effects on workers’ earnings last for decades.
Evidence from Federal Reserve Staff Estimates
These harmful effects on individual workers are not the only
long-term damage from recessions. As emphasized by Reifschneider, Wascher, and Wilcox (2013), physical investment falls sharply in
recessions. The pace at which new firms are formed also falls, as does
research and development by existing firms and the development and
testing of business models. Distortions of the economy’s relative price
structure and the shortfall in spending initiated by a recession make it
difficult to do the economic calculation of whether an investment project is profitable. All of these effects make for a less-productive economy in the long term.
Reifschneider, Wascher, and Wilcox (2013) currently estimate that
three-tenths of the 10 percent shortfall of U.S. output relative to the pre2008 trend will eventually be reversed but that the rest is a permanent
downward-level shift in the path of potential output. Today’s level of
potential output appears to be roughly 7 percent lower than the level
anticipated before the 2008 crisis.
Evidence from the Congressional Budget Office Assessment of
Potential Output
The Federal Reserve staff assessments of the long-run shadow cast
on potential output by the Great Recession are consistent with current
analysis by the Congressional Budget Office. As the weak recovery has
dragged on, CBO has reduced its forecasts of potential output. The forecast for 2014 made in 2013 is 8.2 percent lower than the forecast for
2014 made in 2007. Yang (2014) has decomposed this loss of poten-
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tial output into three components. He finds that about 40 percent is
explained by a long-term decline in projected future labor input measured by total hours worked, 50 percent is explained by a decline in
investment and thus in the accumulation path of physical capital, and
the remaining 10 percent is explained by a fall in the projected growth
path of total factor productivity.
A CBO (2014) study suggests that the Great Recession is not the
reason that potential output has fallen below the path the agency forecast before 2008. “The impact of cyclical weakness in the economy
accounts for just 1.8 percentage points, or about one-fourth, of the difference from the 2007 projection, even though the downward revision
to potential GDP coincided with the severe recession of 2007–2009 and
the subsequent slow recovery” (p. 2). The report states that the primary
reason it has reduced its forecasts of potential output is a slowdown in
trend output growth that began early in the 2000s—but which the agency’s researchers only detected recently—and it is a coincidence that this
pre-2007 growth slowdown was only recognized in the aftermath of the
Great Recession.
We remain skeptical of CBO’s view. As we noted, research consistently finds that recessions following financial crises cause long-term
losses in output. The disappointing U.S. growth since 2007 fits this pattern. It is natural to interpret recent experience as a typical example of
hysteresis, not as some more subtle shift in the economy unrelated to
the recession that occurred at the same time.
Moreover, CBO’s position does not appear fully consistent with
Figure 5.2, which depicts the evolution of CBO’s estimate of potential 2014 GDP. It is noteworthy that the potential output path declines
steadily from 2007 to 2014. This pattern appears contrary to the CBO
claim that revisions are explained by slow growth before 2007 and the
fact that 2007 was a cyclical peak. If those were the real sources of
the revisions, they should have been heavily frontloaded relative to
the downturn—in other words, most of CBO’s revisions should have
occurred as soon as it recognized 2007 as a peak (the National Bureau
of Economic Research called it in December 2008). This is not the case.
As CBO discusses in its 2014 report, its current estimates of potential output growth are heavily influenced by actual output growth
between 2001 and 2007, the last two cyclical peaks. A problem with
this approach is that 2001 was a very strong peak—output appears to
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Figure 5.2 Estimates of 2014 Potential GDP, at Different Points in Time
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have risen substantially above potential, as reflected by the unemployment rate of 3.9 percent in late 2000. The 2007 peak was a weak one—it
achieved its status as a peak only because growth was halted abruptly
by the financial crisis. We suspect that the growth of output between a
strong peak and a weak peak—from a point well above potential to one
closer to potential—underestimates the trend growth rate.

THE POTENTIAL FOR RECOVERY
The U.S. economy is on a path toward long-term underperformance,
but this outcome is not inevitable. The economy spiraled downward in
2008 because of a fall in aggregate demand—sharp declines in con-
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sumption and investment resulting from the disruption of the financial
system and accompanying panic. We believe that a sufficient strengthening of demand can push output back toward its pre-2008 trend and
minimize the long-term damage from the Great Recession.
Where might stronger aggregate demand come from? We can hope
for good luck, such as a surge in investment in new technologies, a rise
in exports driven by economic growth in other countries, or a return
to normal levels of risk tolerance on the part of savers and financial
intermediaries. But a more reliable approach is to use macroeconomic
policy to boost demand.
During the Great Moderation era before 2008, macroeconomic policy typically meant monetary policy. In today’s weak economy, the Federal Reserve should certainly try to support aggregate demand through
an accommodative policy stance. Economists are actively debating
how much unconventional monetary policies such as quantitative easing have contributed to the recovery, the potential for further unconventional policies going forward, and whatever risks might be created
by the interaction of a very large Federal Reserve balance sheet and
our current banking and regulatory system. We will not take a position
on these complex and unsettled issues. Instead, we will emphasize the
most straightforward way to stimulate demand at the zero bound: fiscal
expansion.
A Role for Fiscal Policy?
Fiscal expansion could take the form of cuts in net taxes or increases
in government spending. Well-targeted policies such as public investment would have important direct benefits because the United States
has systematically underinvested in public infrastructure capital. But
for the current discussion the key effect of fiscal policy is the boost that
it provides to aggregate demand.
There have been many conflicting claims in the public debate about
the effects of fiscal policy. Many argue that fiscal expansion is counterproductive because it reduces economic confidence and thus private
spending by more than it increases public spending. However, there has
now been enough policy experience and research to reach a clear and
firm conclusion: fiscal expansion is indeed expansionary in economies
like the United States today, where interest rates are near the zero bound
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and therefore there is little risk of crowding out private investment.
Several years ago, after reviewing a variety of evidence, including
cross-country and time-series analysis and micro examinations of the
2009 Obama stimulus, David Romer (2011) concluded that the positive
effects of fiscal expansion are an issue “that we should view as settled.”
Since then, Blanchard and Leigh (2013) have found that fiscal multipliers in advanced economies were larger than expected during 2009 and
2010, with the result that output fell short of IMF forecasts in countries
that pursued fiscal austerity. Under current conditions, the multiplier—
the effect of a dollar of spending or of net tax cuts on GDP—appears
likely to be not just positive but greater than 1.0.
An economy with a positive multiplier, with hysteresis, and with
interest rates on short-term government debt at their zero bound has
very different characteristics from what we used to think of as a normal economy—one with interest rates even on short-term Treasury debt
bounded well away from zero, with monetary offsets to fiscal policy
substantially reducing if not eliminating the multiplier, and with a tendency to rapidly return to a predownturn potential growth path. In what
we used to see as a normal economy, a fiscal boost had little effect
on current employment and production and, because it raised the debt/
GDP ratio, induced substantial future drag on potential output through
its amortization costs. But when interest rates are near zero, amortization costs are near or less than zero, monetary policy offset is absent,
and persistent hysteresis effects on the tax base have a very high present value. In this setting, a sizable fiscal expansion could go a long way
toward restoring full employment. A shift to greater austerity would
have the opposite effects. Either way, decisions about fiscal policy
today will influence the economy into the distant future.
Fiscal Policy and Debt in the Long Run
Our advocacy of a fiscal expansion runs strongly counter to the conventional wisdom, which is that long-run fiscal sustainability requires
that the government tighten its belt in response to a downturn that
reduces the tax base, even—or perhaps especially—in the case of hysteresis. At a time when the government’s net debt has risen above 70
percent of a year’s GDP, concerns about the federal government’s debt
are no doubt legitimate. An increase in the debt/GDP ratio certainly has
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the potential to reduce the funds available for productive private investment relative to a counterfactual with a stable debt/GDP ratio. And a
debt that is or even looks out of control is a threat to financial stability,
and via its effects on real interest rates an additional drag on capital
formation even if current debt and deficits are not that large.
It is natural to think that a cut in net taxes or an increase in government purchases increases the national debt, and indeed that is the shortrun effect. In the view of many reasonable people, that fact creates a
dilemma: a fiscal expansion is good for the unemployment problem, but
bad for the debt problem. We believe, however, that this tradeoff does
not really exist. Under current circumstances, the long-run effects of
fiscal expansion on the debt are benign.
This conclusion follows from the long-lasting effects of fiscal
expansion on output. In the presence of hysteresis, a one-time temporary cut in net taxes increases output into the distant future. A persistent
output increase creates a persistent rise in tax revenue. These long-term
fiscal benefits can more than amortize the initial rise in the deficit if the
real cost of financing government debt remains low enough.
DeLong and Summers (2012) analyze the conditions under which
a tax cut pays for itself. The key parameters in their analysis include
the short-run multiplier, the effect of a tax cut on current output, and
also the “degree of hysteresis,” the effect of a rise in current output on
potential output, which is an effect that persists into the future. Another
key parameter is the marginal tax rate for the economy, the extra tax
revenue that accrues from an extra dollar of output. For the United
States, the marginal tax rate is approximately one-third. Together, the
multiplier, the degree of hysteresis, and the marginal tax rate determine
the long-run revenue gains from a current fiscal expansion.
Readers can consult the DeLong-Summers paper for the algebra,
which also involves the interest rate paid by the government on its debt.
The bottom line is that, for realistic values of the multiplier and the
marginal tax rate, and assuming interest rates in the future are not much
higher than in the past, only a small degree of hysteresis is needed for
a tax cut to pay for itself. A degree of hysteresis of 0.05 is more than
sufficient: this means that a $1.00 rise in current output must have an
effect on potential output of $0.05 through its effects on investment, the
labor force attachment of workers, and so on. DeLong and Summers
argue that the degree of hysteresis is likely to exceed this threshold by
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a substantial margin, based on both historical evidence and the recent
U.S. experience.
Calibrating the Analysis
We can use the estimates of potential output in Reifschneider,
Wascher, and Wilcox (2013) to produce a simple estimate of the value
of the hysteresis coefficients η. Figure 5.1 shows the Reifschneider et
al. state-space model estimates of the path of the output gap γ, measured
as the difference between potential output (the middle line in the figure)
and actual output (the bottom line). The output gap peaked at 7.3 percent in the third quarter of 2009. Added up over time, the cumulative
output gap C(γ) through the first quarter of 2013 equaled 24.9 percentage point years of U.S. potential output.
Let σ for “scarring” or “shadow” be the difference between what
potential output would have been in the first quarter of 2013 based on
the pre-2008 trend and where it ended up in that quarter according to
the Fed estimates. The value of σ = 6.0 percent. The implicit estimate of
hysteresis η is then simply:
(5.1)

η = σ/C(γ)

and so η = (6.0)/(24.9) = 0.24.
The estimate of η, 0.24, far exceeds the level of hysteresis required
for a tax cut to be self-financing, which is 0.05 or less in the DeLongSummers analysis.
A more sophisticated exercise looks more deeply into the Federal
Reserve Board/U.S. (FRB/US) macroeconomic model that underpins
the analysis of Reifschneider, Wascher, and Wilcox (2013) and is one
of the main tools used by the Federal Reserve. The baseline model
includes one hysteresis effect: a fall in output reduces physical investment, which causes a long-lasting decrease in labor productivity. Reifschneider, Wascher, and Wilcox augment this channel with hysteresis
in the labor market: an output slump has persistent effects on the unemployment rate and labor force participation calibrated to be “roughly
consistent with the experience of the last few years.”3 In unpublished
work, Reifschneider and Summers (n.d.) simulate the FRB/US model
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with and without labor-side hysteresis, taking as their initial conditions the state of the U.S. economy at the business cycle trough in 2009
and anticipation that the federal funds rate would remain at zero for a
number of years. They derive the effects of an increase in government
spending of 1 percent of GDP for six years, from 2009 through 2014.
Figure 5.3 shows the simulated effects of this fiscal stimulus on output,
potential output, the government deficit, and debt.
Panel A in Figure 5.3 shows how the additional fiscal expansion
in 2009 causes output to rise sharply in both versions of the model.
Panel B shows the corresponding rise in potential output, which is
much larger in the model that includes hysteresis in the labor market.
The increase in potential output leads the stimulus to have an effect on
real GDP that persists even after the policy’s direct effects on aggregate
demand are gone.
Panels C and D in Figure 5.3 show that even in the baseline FRB/
US model, the debt/GDP ratio eventually falls below the level it would
have attained without the stimulus. In the model with calibrated labormarket hysteresis, the debt/GDP ratio immediately falls below and
always remains below its baseline no-additional-stimulus level. Twenty
years after the fiscal stimulus begins, this policy has reduced the debt/
GDP ratio by 2.2 percentage points.
There is every reason to expect that these calculations are conservative. Allowing for a supply-side impact of increased public spending or
the possibility that increases today would obviate the need for spending
in the future, as in the case of necessary infrastructure maintenance,
would augment the reduction in the debt/GDP ratio.

CONCLUSION
The weak recovery of the labor market is a national crisis with a real
human dimension. The effects of job loss, in addition to financial strain,
include damage to physical and mental health. Studies have linked
unemployment to higher death rates, particularly immediately after job
loss, but even in the long run by 10–15 percent for at least the next 20
years; higher rates of suicide as unemployment duration stretches on;
and even higher rates of cancer mortality. Furthermore, studies have
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Figure 5.3 Effects of a 1 Percent of GDP Increase in Federal Purchases
for Five Years, with and without Labor-Market Hysterisis
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Figure 5.3 (continued)
Panel C: Federal Surplus-to-GDP Ratio (NIA Basis)
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SOURCE: Reifschneider and Summers (n.d.).
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found that family members of people who have lost their jobs are also
affected: being laid off increases the likelihood of divorce in the years
immediately following the layoff, and children of laid-off workers are
around 15 percent more likely to have to repeat a grade. Furthermore,
the longer one is unemployed, the harder it is to find a new job, and
thus the harder it becomes to escape these terrible costs (Charles and
Stephens Jr. 2001; Classen and Dunn 2012; Huff Stevens and Schaller
2009; Lynge 1997; Shimer 2008; Sullivan and von Wachter 2009).
How can policymakers restore full employment? In our view, it is
easier than one might think. Economics usually teaches us not to believe
in a free lunch. But with even a small degree of hysteresis in a standard
economic model such as the Federal Reserve’s forecasting model, fiscal policymakers face an easy decision if the economy is weak with
low labor demand and if interest rates are stuck at the zero bound. A
fiscal expansion is then a win-win policy. It not only raises employment and output; it also reduces the long-term problem of government
debt. Conversely, an insistence on austerity in these circumstances has
perverse effects: it worsens the debt problem that motivates the policy,
it prolongs the economic slump, and it magnifies the long-term damage
to the labor force and productivity. Keynes was right about fiscal policy,
and Herbert Hoover was wrong about the virtues of belt-tightening during an economic slump.
This past recession will not be the nation’s last, and expansionary fiscal policy will likely be needed again in the future. For reasons
laid out in Summers (2013), we believe that the safe real interest rate
necessary for full employment has declined considerably in the United
States, raising concerns about secular stagnation—the idea that the
financial conditions necessary for adequate growth and production near
potential output are likely unsustainable, and that sustainable finance
is likely to go along with unsatisfactory growth and production well
below potential output. Under such circumstances, it is likely that the
zero lower bound on interest rates will be reached more frequently in
the future than in the past, that fiscal expansion will reduce the need for
extraordinary monetary policies that potentially create instability, and
that debt burdens are less problematic because of lower interest rates.
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Notes
This paper was prepared as part of the Full Employment Project at the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, with support from the Rockefeller Foundation.
1. This idea has a long pedigree, dating back to at least the 1940s, the last time longterm U.S. government real and nominal interest rates were this low. See Lerner
(1943).
2. Some of the labor force decline is due to demography; nevertheless, Hatzius and
Mericle (2014) suggest that the unemployment gap—the difference between the
current rate and full employment—is at least 2.5 percentage points, and this is four
and a half years into an economic expansion.
3. In the specification of Reifschneider, Wascher, and Wilcox (2013), labor market
hysteresis arises when unemployment exceeds its natural rate by 1.25 percentage
points or more. In this situation, an additional percentage point of unemployment
in a quarter causes a persistent increase in the natural rate of 0.02 points and a
persistent decrease in labor force participation of 0.04 points.
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International Dimensions
of the Great Recession
and the Weak Recovery
Kathryn M.E. Dominguez
University of Michigan and NBER

The global economic slowdown that followed the U.S. financial
crisis in 2008 was deeper and longer lasting than any previous economic downturn other than the Great Depression. Indeed, the downturn
is widely referred to as the Great Recession, testimony to its severity in
comparison to other postwar recessions, while at the same time delineating it as a recession and not a depression. Worldwide GDP fell by
over 15 percent during the Great Depression. The global GDP decline
during the Great Recession was much lower—around 1 percent—but
the slow pace of the recovery from the recent downturn is unprecedented. This chapter will examine the reasons for the weak recovery
from the Great Recession. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011, 2014) make a
strong case for why recessions precipitated by financial crises are likely
to be more severe than those caused by other factors, which is undoubtedly part of the explanation.1 The international dimensions of the recent
financial crisis are also significant contributors to both the diffusion and
persistence of the weak recovery.

COMPARISONS TO THE GREAT DEPRESSION
The Great Depression started with major economic contractions in
the period 1930–1933, but the U.S. economy rebounded strongly in the
subsequent three years with an average growth rate of 11 percent. In
contrast, the Great Recession only lasted six quarters, but growth rates
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have only averaged 2.2 percent over the six subsequent years. Figure
6.1 compares annual real GDP growth in the United States during the
1930s to current growth rates. It dramatically illustrates that the depth
of the Great Depression far exceeded our recent experience, while at
the same time showing the relatively slow pace of the current recovery.
Economists have long studied the causes and consequences of the
Great Depression, and among the many lessons learned from that experience was that fiscal and monetary policy decisions in that time period
likely exacerbated the severity and persistence of the downturn (Brown
1956; Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Keynes 1936; Romer 1992; Temin
1989). Figures 6.2 and 6.3 compare the fiscal and monetary policy
responses taken during the Great Depression relative to actions taken
in the wake of the Great Recession. As DeLong (1998) describes, the
U.S. government did not consider economic stabilization, let alone full
employment, as one of its responsibilities prior to the Great DepresFigure 6.1 Comparing the Great Recession to the Great Depression,
in Annual Real GDP Growth
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Figure 6.2 U.S. Fiscal Policy Response Comparison
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sion. The government borrowed to pay for wars and attempted to run
surpluses during peacetimes to pay off the accrued debts, which led
to the principle that the only good peacetime budget was a balanced
budget. It was not until the passage of the Employment Act of 1946
that the federal government was required to actively manage the macro
economy, though by 1931 U.S. fiscal deficits started to rise as a consequence of the congressional override of Hoover’s veto of the veterans’
bonus (Hausman 2016) and other relief expenditures, as well as the
collapse in tax revenues. The fiscal response to the Great Recession
was, in comparative terms, strong and swift. Figure 6.2 also shows the
fiscal response to the recession in 1982, which was far stronger than
was the case in the 1930s but less aggressive than the approach taken
after 2008. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of
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Figure 6.3 U.S. Monetary Policy Response Comparison
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2009 provided around $800 billion in tax cuts and federal spending to
stimulate the economy, and various other programs (Cash for Clunkers,
the extension and expansion of the housing tax credit, the job tax credit,
and extensions of emergency unemployment insurance benefits) added
another $200 billion in stimulus spending.
The U.S. monetary response to the Great Recession was also dramatically different from the approach taken in the 1930s. As is evident
in Figure 6.3, it was not until the United States left the gold standard in
1933 that monetary policy became more expansionary during the Great
Depression. In contrast, the Federal Reserve’s immediate and unprecedented approach to providing liquidity to financial markets began with
a half-point reduction in the federal funds target rate (to 4.75 percent) in
September 2007, followed by further reductions that brought the target
rate down to a range of 0 to 0.25 percent by December 2008. In 2007,
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the Fed created a Term Auction Facility (TAF), which provided banks
with additional access to liquidity. This was followed by a series of
extraordinary credit mechanisms: in March 2008, the Term Securities
Lending Facility (TSLF), which allowed banks and eventually nonbank financial institutions to exchange less-liquid securities for U.S.
Treasury bills; the Commercial Paper Funding facility; and the Term
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). In October 2008, the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 was passed, which provided up to $700 billion to the Fed to purchase a wide array of illiquid
assets through the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). In 2009 the
Fed announced its first round of quantitative easing, which involved the
purchase of $1 trillion of securities, and in 2010 it announced a second
round of $750 billion.
The aggressive U.S. policy response to the financial crisis was, and
remains, controversial. The efficacy of specific policies, the size of the
programs, and the approach to implementation will likely be debated
for decades to come. Lessons from the Great Depression clearly spurred
policymakers to action, and it seems likely that the policies, at the very
least, delayed the slowdown in U.S. growth. However, fiscal and monetary policy actions, whether because they were not aggressive enough
or because other factors complicated their efficacy, were not able to
head off the Great Recession.

FORECASTING THE GREAT RECESSION
Are major economic downturns predictable? Dominguez, Fair, and
Shapiro (1988) find no evidence that contemporary forecasters realized
that a major economic downturn would follow the 1929 stock market
crash. Likewise, there is little evidence that professional or government
forecasters could predict the Great Recession. Figure 6.4 shows the
probability distributions of U.S. GDP growth calculated by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York before and after the Lehman Bank failure
in September 2008. The solid line in the figure is based on data available up to November 2008, and the dashed line is based on data available through April 2008. The actual depth of the Great Recession was 5
percent; in April 2008 the Fed forecasters attributed less than 3 percent
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Figure 6.4 Forecasting the Great Recession: Probability Distribution
before and after the Lehman Failure
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SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York research staff; Potter (2011).

probability to this outcome, and even in November 2008 the probability
of the actual outcome was only 15 percent.
It was not just forecasts of the U.S. economy that missed the mark—
there is little cross-country evidence that forecasters could predict the
global downturn. Figure 6.5 shows the International Monetary Fund’s
(IMF) average rolling forecast errors over various horizons starting in
1990 and ending in 2012 for 188 countries. Forecast errors were gen-
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Figure 6.5 IMF’s Rolling Forecast Errors by Horizon, 1990–2012
(percentage points, annual average)
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erally positive in the 1990s, meaning that the IMF forecast exceeded
actual GDP growth. Between 2000 and 2007 forecast errors were negative, indicating that economic growth was stronger than what IMF forecasters expected. In the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008, forecast errors again swung positive, with five-year horizon forecast errors
nearing an unprecedented 3 percent.

FORECASTING THE RECOVERY
Although most forecasters missed the depth and severity of the
Great Recession, they seem to have largely anticipated the slow recov-
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ery. Dominguez and Shapiro (2013) examine real GDP forecasts and
forecast revisions starting in 2009 by the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) maintained by the Philadelphia Fed, the Eurozone Survey
of Professional Forecasters maintained by the European Central Bank
(ECB), and the IMF World Economic Outlook forecasts. Figure 6.6
shows actual real U.S. GDP from 2007 to 2012 (the solid line) along
with average eight-quarter-ahead SPF forecasts (the dashed lines) starting at the trough of the Great Recession (mid-2009). The SPF forecasts
are initially overly pessimistic, but over time they track actual GDP
growth closely, and revisions of the outlook consistently shift downward over time. In 2012 the SPF forecasts predict a downward shift not
Figure 6.6 U.S. Real GDP Forecast: Actual and Survey of Professional
Forecasters, 2007–2014
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only of the trend path but also in the growth rate of GDP. Importantly,
as Dominguez and Shapiro (2013) emphasize: “Nowhere in the forecast
horizon since the 2009 trough have forecasters projected a return to the
pre–Great Recession trend path” (pp. 149). Figure 6.7 shows that this
“new normal” of not returning to the previous trend path of GDP is also
evident in the actual and SPF forecast data in the aftermath of the 1991
and 2001 recessions. The “old normal” of a rapid return to the previous
trend path is only evident after the 1981 recession.
It is interesting to note that when we compare the recent U.S. recovery to recoveries from the four previous post–WWII recessions, trend
GDP growth across all five recoveries looks fairly similar in the first
few quarters, but then we see evidence of a negative shock about a year
into the recovery after the 1973, 1981, and 2008 downturns. However,
instead of the quick reversal to stronger growth that we saw in the 1970s
Figure 6.7 U.S. Real GDP Forecast: Actual and Survey of Professional
Forecasters, 1981–2011
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and 1980s, Figure 6.8 shows that the recovery in the recent period never
experiences a growth uptick. Table 6.1 provides a comparison of historical recoveries across the past 11 NBER-dated recessions. The Great
Recession stands out for sustaining the largest 4-quarter GDP decline at
the start of the recession, and the smallest GDP rise over the subsequent
10 quarters.
What might account for the unusually slow pace of the recovery
after the Great Recession? One factor that the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) has emphasized is the concomitant reduction in potential
GDP. “CBO estimates that about two-thirds of the difference between
growth in real GDP in the current recovery and the average for other
recoveries can be attributed to sluggish growth in potential GDP” (CBO
2012, pp. 2–3). Figure 6.9 shows actual real GDP starting in 2003 to the
present, along with the precrisis trend, and CBO’s estimate of potential
GDP. The slower growth in potential GDP is, in turn, largely attributed
to “long-term trends unrelated to the cycle, including the nation’s changFigure 6.8 U.S. Real GDP Recovery Comparisons
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Table 6.1 GDP Growth: Historical Recovery Comparisons
Recession
% change from peak at start of recession
Start
End
4 quarters 8 quarters 12 quarters 14 quarters
Nov. 1948
Oct. 1949
−1.6
11.6
17.3
18.7
July 1953
May 1954
−2.2
5.2
7.5
9.1
Aug. 1957
April 1958
−0.9
6.0
8.4
7.7
April 1960
Feb. 1961
−1.0
6.4
10.3
13.8
Dec. 1969
Nov. 1970
0.4
9.2
14.5
14.6
Nov. 1973
March 1975
−2.0
0.5
4.8
8.1
Jan. 1980
July 1980
1.6
−0.9
0.6
4.9
July 1981
Nov. 1982
−2.7
2.8
9.8
11.8
July 1990
March 1991
−0.7
2.3
5.3
7.2
March 2001 Nov. 2001
1.5
3.3
7.3
9.0
Dec. 2007
June 2009
−3.3
−3.8
−0.8
−0.4
Average without recession
of 2007–2009

−0.7

4.6

8.6

10.5

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Bureau of Economic Research.

ing demographics” (CBO 2012, pp. 3). Past recoveries were helped by
favorable demographic trends coming from increases in labor force participation of women and the strength of the baby boom, while the most
recent recovery coincided with the retirement of baby boomers.

BUSINESS CYCLE COMOVEMENT
When America sneezes, the world catches cold—meaning, business cycles across the globe are increasingly synchronous with the U.S.
cycle.2 Ng and Wright (2013) provide an excellent survey of business
cycle facts, updated to include the data from the Great Recession, and
find strong evidence that recessions with financial market origins are
different from those driven by supply or monetary policy shocks, and
that when countries are more financially integrated, business cycles are
more synchronous. In real business cycle models with complete markets, financially integrated economies will correlate negatively, leading
to low synchronicity. However, if we (realistically) allow for the exis-
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Figure 6.9 Great Recession GDP, Precrisis Trend, and CBO Potential
GDP Estimate
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SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: Real GDP, billions of chained 2009
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estimate of the output the economy would produce with a high rate of use of its capital
and labor resources. The data are adjusted to remove the effects of inflation; trend line
based on prerecession GDP growth.

tence of financial frictions that impede perfect risk sharing, business
cycle models generally predict higher synchronicity when countries are
more financially open and connected (Baxter and Crucini 1995).
Business cycle comovement is likely to increase when trade and
financial linkages are stronger and policy responses are more similar.
Figure 6.10 shows how U.S. trade volume (measured as imports plus
exports as a share of GDP) has evolved over time; trade fell precipitously during the Great Recession, providing an important channel
through which the downturn in the United States spread to the rest of
the globe. However, the fact that trade volume bounced back to prerecession levels by early 2010 suggests that the trade channel is unlikely
to be an important contributor to the slow global recovery. Cross-country
holdings of assets grew dramatically in the early 2000s, and interestingly, while the rapid growth in foreign ownership of U.S. assets has
largely returned to its prerecession trend line, the growth in U.S. hold-
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Figure 6.10 U.S. Trade Linkages (share of trade in U.S. GDP)
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SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis: Imports of Goods and Services plus
Exports of Goods and Services over GDP.

ings of foreign assets has leveled off. This pattern tracks the recovery of
global financial markets and returns; the U.S. recovery has been unusually slow, but the recovery in the rest of the globe has been even slower.
The timing of policy responses to the global downturn have also
contributed to business cycle synchronicity. The European Central
Bank held its target interest rate constant for a full year after the Fed
started on its expansionary path, and initially it looked as if most developing countries would not be dragged down by the unfolding financial crisis in the advanced countries. By mid-2009, however, the Great
Recession had become a global recession, and most countries followed
the U.S. policy lead by implementing expansionary fiscal and monetary
policy programs (Almunia et al. 2010). Toward the end of 2009 the
U.S. economy looked as if it were on the brink of a robust rebound, and
although the rest of the world was playing catch-up, economic forecasts were relatively optimistic for the global economy.3 This upbeat
forecast was fairly quickly reversed when the financial/fiscal problems
in Europe began to be better understood. In 2011 global forecasts were
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substantially revised downward as a result of the combination of negative news from Japan due to the earthquake and tsunami, the euro-wide
consequences of the ongoing debt crisis in Southern Europe, and the
U.S. fiscal impasse, which led Standard and Poor’s to downgrade U.S.
government debt. Additional negative news continued in 2012, when
the eurozone, the U.K., and Japan returned to recession; in 2013, when
Cyprus and Portugal required bank bailouts and the U.S. government
shut-down briefly; and in 2014, with Japan again returning to recession
and the Russian Ruble crisis.

COMBINING NARRATIVE EVIDENCE WITH FORECASTS
Real-time economic forecasts provide high-frequency information
about the perceived state of the economy based on available data. Likewise, narrative information from contemporaneous news reports and
government announcements help to identify the policy and financial
market shocks to the global economy that potentially influenced the forecasts. Dominguez and Shapiro (2013) follow in the tradition of Ramey
and Shapiro (1998) and Romer and Romer (2010) to combine forecast
revisions with narrative information in the years immediately following
the Great Recession to better understand the reasons for the slow U.S.
recovery. They argue that the U.S. recovery from the Great Recession
was stalled in 2010, 2011, and 2012 by negative shocks mainly emanating from Europe. Table 6.2 updates the narrative evidence through 2014
and includes a broader group of countries in the analysis. Whereas most
news concerning the Great Recession is centered on the United States
in 2008–2009, the focus shifts to the eurozone starting in 2010, to Asia
in 2011, and to Russia in 2014.
Table 6.3 documents the revisions in the two-year cumulative economic outlook for 14 countries over the period 2009–2014 using the
IMF’s World Economic Outlook forecasts. These forecast revisions
in the IMF’s outlook for the United States align well with the narrative evidence summarized in Table 6.2. Negative shocks from Europe,
Asia, and Russia led to substantial downward revisions in growth prospects for countries in these regions, and these shocks also seem to have
adversely impacted the outlook for the United States.
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Table 6.2 Percent of Occurrences of Recession-Related Policy and
Financial Market News Events
U.K. & Russia
Eurozone
Year
U.S. news
Asia news
news
news
2008
55
10
11
24
2009
52
15
10
23
2010
33
2
3
62
2011
13
20
2
65
2012
2013
2014

8
20
9

21
11
18

6
7
27

65
62
45

SOURCE: Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, BBC News, Federal Reserve websites,
U.S. Treasury, European Central Bank, European Commission.

CONCLUSIONS
The slow recovery from the Great Recession has lowered prospective standards of living for people in the United States and around the
world. The consequences of the high levels of unemployment, especially
for those who were just starting their working careers when the recession hit, are likely to be felt for many decades to come. Older workers
whose savings and pension plans were devastated by the financial crisis
are unlikely to ever recuperate those losses. Moreover, the slow pace
of recovery in business investment, worker productivity, and consumer
confidence suggests that even those not directly hit by the recession will
be affected. It is difficult to fully explain these outcomes based only on
U.S. economic conditions, even if we consider the precipitating financial crisis and CBO’s estimates of the reduction in potential GDP. The
international dimension of the weak recovery is unsurprising given the
complex interdependencies of the global economy. The 2008 financial
crisis started in the United States but soon spread around the globe.
The aftershocks from this crisis and the subsequent Great Recession
continue to reverberate in Europe, Asia, and Russia, along with their
own homegrown economic crises. These combined shocks in turn have
prolonged and weakened the global recovery.
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2.7
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0.3

−0.1
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Russia

China

4.1
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0.3
−0.7
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NOTE: Revisions from the second to fourth quarter of the forecast for the cumulative percent change real GDP two years ahead.
SOURCE: IMF World Economic Outlook reports, April 2009–October 2014.
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Notes
1. See also Romer and Romer (2015), who argue that output declines following
financial crises are highly variable and depend importantly on the severity and
persistence of the financial distress itself.
2. This is thought to be a modern adaptation of a nineteenth century saying attributed
to Austria’s Prince Clemens von Metternich, originally: “When France sneezes all
Europe catches a cold.”
3. See the IMF’s World Economic Outlook forecasts for 2009 in Table 6.3.
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About the Institute
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofit research
organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to employmentrelated problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an activity of the
W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was established in
1932 to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E. Upjohn, founder of The Upjohn
Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment income during
economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of publications.
Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a research program conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists; 2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements the internal research
program by providing financial support to researchers outside the Institute; 3) a
publications program, which provides the major vehicle for disseminating the
research of staff and grantees, as well as other selected works in the field; and
4) an Employment Management Services division, which manages most of the
publicly funded employment and training programs in the local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication programs are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public
and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solutions
to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and income
maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work arrangements;
family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional economic development and local labor markets.
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